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Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact of political institutions: central government vis a 
vis local governments, in the territorial allocation of central government’s 
transfers. The effect of political forces in the transfers system is analysed in the 
setting of a resource rich economy. Using data from local public finances in 
Ecuador, this research illustrates the political variables that interact with 
normative concerns, underlying intergovernmental relations. And although 
recent policies shifted towards an equitable territorial development agenda, 
path dependent and/or discretional behaviour have prolonged territorial 
differential access to central government resources. Furthermore, fiscal 
dependence on oil revenues makes the Ecuadorian case a significant laboratory 
to examine how the political economy of intergovernmental finances is related 
with the occurrence of natural resource revenues. It uses quantitative methods, 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Fixed Effects Model (FEM) to 
study the determinants of transfers’ distribution. The results support the 
assumption that political institutions affected the intergovernmental 
distribution of transfers, increasing the territorial disparities in the access to 
central government resources. Moreover, this study has uncovered several 
important factors that are associated with the occurrence of resource surpluses. 
First, resource surpluses weaken political and fiscal restraints. Second, it 
provides evidence of the fiscal vulnerability to oil revenues, and therefore, it 
raises distress about the sustainability of public spending in Ecuador. 
Relevance to Development Studies 
Distributional considerations are at the heart of the state-led development 
paradigm. However, the degree at which the government coherently channels 
its efforts to redistribute resources across the national territory relies on 
institutional arrangements, and it is responsive to territorial structures. For that 
reason, this research attempts to shed light on how the state interacts with local 
actors, observing territorial distributive features. 
Keywords 
Intergovernmental Finances · Territorial Inequality · Lobby Groups · 
Budgetary Cycles · Redistribution · Resource Revenues · Public Spending 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
‘Where do people earn the Per Capita Income?  
More than one poor starving soul would like to know. 
In our countries, numbers live better than people. 
 How many people prosper in times of prosperity? 
 How many people find their lives developed by development?’ 
Eduardo Galeano,  
‘Those Little Numbers and People’1 
 
Distributional considerations are in the heart of the critics of a market-oriented 
development paradigm applied in Ecuador during the so called ‘lost decade’2 
and subsequent neoliberal reforms. In an effort to bring inequality to a critical 
examination that deals with an uneven territorial development inherited from 
past regimes; several political, social and economic reforms have been 
implemented in the very recent years. 
In this line, equitable development policies demand a research agenda that 
unveils the elements causing persisting territorial inequality in Ecuador, which 
is in fact a core objective to be fought against in the new political agenda. The 
rationale underlying this idea is to influence the elements conditioning 
territorial disparities. That is the role of local governments, and their 
interaction with the central government with regard to intergovernmental 
finances. 
This equalizing territorial shift can be studied within a political economy 
framework, in order to better understand the political factors influencing the 
intergovernmental finances in Ecuador. Therefore, this study intends to 
evaluate the inter-institutional impact of political institutions, more specifically: 
the central government vis a vis the local governments with regard to the 
territorial allocation of central government transfers. This is the main variable 
describing intergovernmental relations within this context.  
While recent policies shifted towards an equitable territorial development 
agenda, path dependent and/or discretional (or even tactic) actions may have 
extended territorial disparities in the access to central government resources. In 
this line, the research paper addresses an essential question underlying the 
political economy of intergovernmental finances in Ecuador: how do political 
institutions affect the intergovernmental distribution of transfers? This inquiry 
encompasses specific interrogations, namely: what are the tacit determinants or 
allocation rules of the transfer system? Is the distribution of transfers just due 
                                                
1 As found in Farmer (2005) 
2 For an overview of the Latin American trajectory regarding contemporary 
development, please refer to Green (2003) 
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to secular changes? Or is there any evidence of normative concerns? Can it be 
predominantly influenced by political factors?  
Besides the conventional normative concerns, primary object of debate 
when looking at intergovernmental finances, the impact of political forces 
conditioning central government transfers is enriched by setting the analysis in 
the situation of a resource rich economy. Using data from local public finances 
in Ecuador, the research attempts to show the variables that determine the 
transfer system over time considering a changing sectorial normative on the 
principal commodity exported by the country: oil.  
Moreover, fiscal dependence on oil revenues makes of the Ecuadorian 
case a significant laboratory to examine how the political economy of 
intergovernmental finances is related with the occurrence of natural resource 
revenues. There is sustained evidence that resource revenues dramatically 
infringe the so called rational public spending (as found in Collier 2010). If it 
holds that resource revenues are likely to weaken political restraints and hence, 
deepen social and territorial disparities, a structural change in how 
intergovernmental funds are allocated will be required.  
The paper is organized as follows: I will introduce the research topic in 
chapter one; subsequently the research goals and core questions will be placed 
in a particular analytical framework, developed in chapter two and directed to 
study the redistributive role of public finances. In this section, I will explore 
the role of lobby groups, political business cycles, and tactical redistribution in 
public sector decision making. The aforementioned concepts will be 
investigated for its territorial application. In chapter three, the Ecuadorian 
context will be presented. It includes topics on equitable territorial 
development, as stated in the specific institutional framework. Possible sources 
of territorial inequalities and the scope for redistribution are briefly discussed. 
In chapter four, I present the analysis of the determinants of central transfers’ 
allocation. Since I make use of panel data, fixed effects model (FEM) and 
generalized method of moments (GMM) are the preferred methods presented. 
Chapter five discusses the empirical results followed by the conclusion in 
chapter six. 
1.1 Research goals and core questions 
The goal of this research is to understand the determinants of 
intergovernmental finances in a resource rich economy, by looking at the 
Ecuadorian case. In other words, I seek to understand the geography of public 
finances placement, understood as the interaction with observed and 
unobserved location-specific attributes that influence public financial resources 
placement (Walle et al. 1995); with a particular focus on the local political 
institutions and [central] government structure in intergovernmental finances 
in Ecuador. To disclose the research objective, the core question that guides 
this study is: how do political institutions affect the intergovernmental 
distribution of transfers?  
Thus, I am inquiring what are the tacit determinants, or allocation rules, 
that guide the Ecuadorian transfer system. And besides what the norm states, I 
will also explore secular changes (or the absence of them, that will provide 
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evidence about path dependency when financing local governments).  I have 
some insights about normative concerns underlying intergovernmental 
finances. Yet, I am also aware of the political factors (i.e. interest groups) 
interacting between and within territories, that have the potential to influence 
the normative and the design of institutional mechanisms, due to specific 
motivations. 
Some considerations regarding intergovernmental finances need to be 
taken at this point. First, it is important to bear in mind that an important share 
of central government resources allocated to the territories does not take place 
through the direct financing to province governments, municipalities, or rural 
parish boards. But since the complete set of territorial based policies involves a 
detailed work to gather information, a changing legal framework, and it is 
mostly unorganized; it escapes the scope of this research3.  
 
                                                
3 For a more in-depth treatment of territorialized central government interventions, see 
Ministerio de Finanzas et al. 2010, Azevedo et al. 2008, Vos et al. 2003. So far, the 
research focus of this branch of studies in Ecuador has been kept in the social sector 
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Chapter 2 Analytical framework 
2.1 Literature review on Public Finances: the relevance of the 
Local 
 
Local public finances can play an important role, albeit complementary, to 
central government finances, when assessing the distributional consequences 
of public policy. Several studies have been conducted to analyse 
intergovernmental finances, from authors like Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) 
that emphasize on efficiency and equity imperatives; or Weingast (1995) and 
his concept of market-preserving federalism.  
However, it can be claimed that ‘the distribution of intergovernmental 
transfer is above all a political issue’ (Gordin 2006). And it is with this 
motivation that the intergovernmental fiscal relations will be discussed in the 
underneath developed literature review, quarrying on the political factors 
conditioning it. 
The political economy of local public finances 
The aim of this section of the literature review is to understand important 
political issues related with public sector decision making, in its different 
territorial layers. In this view, central government interaction with local 
authorities can be fairly explored under the broad umbrella of political 
economy.  
Nevertheless, political economy is not always regarded with favour of 
approval in the social sciences. The concept has changed both in its definition 
and scope of application. And furthermore, the new contributions in this area 
from the positive economist stand had been charged with ‘pretence of 
knowledge’ (Schnellenbach 2002). 
Besides its contested role in development studies, and in an effort to 
expand the domain of economic policy analysis and enriching its proposals, I 
will present a brief exploration on how politics and economics can be 
integrated and can contribute to a broader understanding of public sector 
decision making.  
The section begins with an overview about political economy theories and 
concepts, then it focuses on the recent contributions on intergovernmental 
interactions, (i.e. central government vis a vis local governments, and within 
local governments interactions) and finally, it proposes an analytical framework 
ought to be applied in this particular paper by means of a survey on previously 
applied empirical strategies. 
Political Economy: in the search of an institutional framework 
The historical antecedents of the analysis of public sector decision making, 
track back to the classical political economy, having Adam Smith and John 
Stuart Mill as the greatest expositors in this area. Classical economists used the 
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term political economy interchangeably with economics (Besley 2006), but with 
a clear cut between the positive science and the art of decision making, or its 
precepts. Therefore, an unavoidable normative or regulative character was 
implicit in the political economy, by prescribing ‘what ought to be’ (Ibid). 
Then, the term political economy changed to be used for comparative 
analysis of economic systems, especially in debates related with the relative 
merits of socialism and capitalism (Besley 2006). Discussion on political and 
economic issues where under the category of ‘market socialism’ debates (Ibid).  
At the present time and when looking at new political economy, authors 
seem to use this jargon to encompass any analysis that links economics and 
politics. However, a narrower definition provided by Besley (2006), proposes 
that public choice is located as the mainstream analytical tool that draws out 
the implications of rational self-interest for political interactions. This derived 
in different theoretical contributions, like the proposition of  rational economic 
agents interacting with a benevolent dictator (namely the state) which 
maximizes social welfare defined by a welfare function (Laffont 2001 in Besley 
2006); non-cooperative games conducted by rules specified by political 
institutions and that remarks the importance of interest groups and the 
inherently incentive problems existing when economic policy is delegated to 
politicians (Dixit 1996 and Laffont 2000, in Besley 2006)or that can support 
the  claim favouring decentralization, in order to deal with efficiency losses and 
gains of a better accountability (Seabright 1996 in Besley 2006).  
However, the abovementioned analytical tools provided in the new 
political economy, in order to produce ‘value-free statements’ regarding the 
preferences over alternative social orders, may bound to fail if the basic 
assumption, which is information, does not hold (Schnellenbach 2002).  The 
fallibility mechanism follows: traditional public choice theory examines political 
competition as a possible means of leading the political process to a result that 
is in compliance with the preferences of the median voter (Ibid). This definition 
assumes a typology of politics that is rational4 in addition to self-interested. 
Consequently, it proposes a normative framework that ‘legitimates the domain 
of the state in terms of the functions that citizens would freely consent to hand 
to the government’ (Besley 2006). The formal mechanism would be through 
constitutions, which act as constraints for self-interest. However, all this 
process can only hold if the actors involved (e.g. state and citizens) have access 
to information: 
‘Limited accountability due to imperfect information is one of the main 
reasons why conflicts of interest between governors and governed cannot be 
completely resolved’ (Besley 2006) 
                                                
4 Even the meaning of rationality is not that clear in public choice theory: ‘In some 
contributions, a political process is considered to be rational if its outcome coincides 
with the median voter’s preferences, while others equate rationality with the 
transitivity of the social preference ordering, and still other contributions continue to 
use the yardstick of Pareto-efficiency to evaluate the results of the political process’. 
(Schnellenbach 2002) 
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So far, I have shown that a vast literature focuses on electoral preferences 
in order to understand decision making, arguing that politics would converge 
to the preferences of decision making (as described by Downs 1957, in Besley 
2007).  
Nonetheless, as Besley (2007) notes, there is an increasing understanding 
about the importance of institutional structures in order to explain systematic 
differences between median voter preferences and policy outcomes. In 
addition, extra-electoral policy making has capture recent attention, focussing 
on the role of lobbying and interest groups that participate in the political 
process in order to influence policy outcomes (Grossman and Helpman 1994). 
What is more, when looking at intergovernmental relations, the demand for 
policy coordination increases instead of competition between democratic 
[local] governments that can lead to a Pareto-inferior outcome. 
The motivation that leads me to make use of political economy analysis, 
despite of the strong critiques to this branch of literature, is that it can play an 
important role in enabling individuals to come to informed values. However, it 
will not constitute ‘a substitute for political philosophy and for critical 
reasoning’ (Schnellenbach 2002) about the ordering of the society. 
 
‘...what happens if the median voter is the ... socialist or the classical liberal 
and want to surrender some efficiency for political ideals? Or how does New 
Political Economy respond to an autocrat who wants to maximize GDP 
growth but has no interest in the will of his or her people’ (Schnelenbach 196) 
 
A particular case of policy [mis]coordination: the resource curse 
Collier explores a different approach to the resource curse notion, besides the 
Dutch disease and its detrimental effect on the trade balance, or the thesis of 
crises originated in the inherent volatility (boom-and-bust phenomenon) of 
primary commodities. He focuses in democracy malfunction (Collier 2007). 
The author proposes that in the presence of poverty, valuable resources rents 
seem to be damaging for development, giving no space for rational public 
spending. Alternatively, a ‘new law of the jungle of electoral competition in the 
presence of natural resources: the survival of the fattest’. In other words, resource 
revenues induce perverse competition among public institutions, with harmful 
consequences for development. 
In this logic, the apparatus for the survival of the fattest behaves as follows: 
an abundance of resource rents alters the mechanism of electoral competition. 
Different public institutions compete for attracting votes in the most cost-
effective manner, mainly by delivering public services more effectively than a 
rival can5. If the political institutions allow patronage politics, the perverse 
                                                
5 This research will not cover the problem of resource rents as being proneness to 
autocracy. For an extension of this hypothesis refer to Collier (2007: 49-50) 
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competition among and within institutions leave the corrupt as winners 
(Collier 2007: 50) 
In his view, resource surpluses do not only induce a large inefficient public 
sector in contrast to the ‘minimal state’: the main problem is that, as an adverse 
net effect of democracy, the resource rich economies tend to underinvest. 
Underinvestment refers not only to the rate of the investment, but also to the 
return on investments. Namely, politicians have incentives to invest on white 
elephant projects (i.e. projects in which it cost exceed its usefulness). And this 
happens because governments in general, do not value investments that only 
come to fruition in the future affecting sustained increases in income (Ibid) 
since they are politically costly. Governments invest in low return projects that 
can be easily implemented and appreciated by the voters in the short track. 
 
Extra-electoral policy making and its interplay with normative 
approaches 
 
2.1...1 Extra-electoral policy making: the political support 
framework 
I briefly mentioned in the previous section the attractiveness of extra-electoral 
policy making. Since voting models tend to treat parties as competing firms, 
this models can lead to voting cycles (when one party can always propose a 
policy platform that beats any other), probabilistic voting (in which a second 
problem arises, related with the fact that politics are not infinitely pliable), or 
just by observing that there can be systematic differences between median 
preferences and policy outcomes (Besley 2007). 
Subsequently, if the focus is shifted towards institutions, in the sense that 
institutional structures can be more important than electoral preferences when 
defining the real ordering of the society, the attention should be placed in the 
analysis extra-electoral policy making. As a result, the set up for my analytical 
framework includes models of political support. Within this framework, model 
on interest groups are highly appealing, since they offer the possibility to 
analyse how institutional changes can affect policies equilibrium. 
More specifically, the political support framework seeks to deal with 
interest groups and how they influence government choices, as may be 
illustrated by models on rational opportunistic political budgetary cycles (Veiga 
and Pinho 2007) and wide-ranging topics on extra-electoral policy making 
(Grossman and Helpman 1994, Gawande and Li 2009). In short, the 
aforementioned models are particularly interesting for this empirical 
application. 
In a detailed review of the political support approach, a key author is 
Grossman (1994). In his work Protection for Sale (Grossman and Helpman 1994) 
develops a model to understand the structure of trade protection. Although the 
model is applied to analyse trade tariffs and subsidies, it is applicable to a 
number of redistributive policies (Gawande and Li 2009).  
The model derives the government’s objective as dependent on campaign 
contributions (coming from different interest groups) and voter well-being 
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(which is understood as the utility level achieved by the average voter).  The 
aim is to provide a framework to analyse how institutional changes would 
affect equilibrium policies by endogenously changing the shape of the political-
support function. Mainly, the methodology seeks to make explicit the process 
by which the government pays attention to the concern of particular interest 
groups.  
Nevertheless, there are some preconditions for these interest groups to 
influence policy outcomes: they must be organized. The author argues that 
organized interest groups are able to offer political contributions. Their 
motivation is different from that stated in electoral competition models. In the 
latter, the interest groups make contributions by the prospect of influencing 
policy rather than motivated for electoral outcomes as in the former proposes. 
Hence, their contributions are valued by politicians, who perceive them as a 
potential gain for the upcoming election process. Under this logic, the 
government maximizes an aggregate social welfare function devised from a 
weighted sum of the total contributions originated in the interest groups. In 
other words, politicians see a relationship between total collections (i.e. sum of 
individual contributions from lobby groups) and their re-election prospects. 
By means of stressing political support, it is possible to understand which 
interest groups will be especially successful in capturing the outcome of a 
policy. Grossman and Helpman (1994), make use of lobbies that represent 
special interest groups. And as specified by the authors, in contrast to the 
literature on voting competition, interest groups are motivated to make 
contributions to influence policy (and the aggregate social welfare) rather than 
linking its own contribution to the election outcome. Under this logic, their 
model has similar structure to those of common agency problem and moral 
hazard, due to the risk implicit in the unobserved actions by politicians. 
 
2.1...2 Normative framework for intergovernmental relations 
Along with public choice theories, fiscal federalism provides a normative 
framework to analyse the interactions between different government levels and 
their competences (accompanied with financial resources) across territories 
(Veiga and Pinho 2007). Then, intergovernmental finances constitute an 
important tool to allocate funds among different levels within the public 
sector. Due to its normative category, this approach assumes that the central 
government is motivated by efficiency and equity goals, with the broader 
objective of maximizing the welfare of the population (Ibid). 
This section of the literature review follows the argument: ‘public 
spending is a potentially powerful instrument for fighting poverty’ (Walle et al. 
1995). On the other hand, anti-poverty strategies often overlook equity 
concerns (Townsend and Gordon 2002). Thus, this section brings together 
poverty reduction and equity concerns by looking at elements of public 
finances at the local level. 
So far, this paper has focussed in public finances. Nevertheless, public 
financial resources have the final objective of being spent by politicians in their 
localities, following different governing principles, to name a few: 
maximization of social welfare, tactical spending, of simply self-interest. A 
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merely disorganized or even worse, an intentionally concentrated public 
spending can enhance territorial disparities, and deepen poverty across its 
inhabitants. This is the scope of a normative approach to interplay with public 
sector decision making. 
 
2.1...3 The Role of Distributive Politics in a Territorial Basis 
Positive political economy can help to inform individuals about the choice of 
political institutions associated with efficiency [gains] losses. Taking into 
account that this research takes place in a geographical basis, the previously 
discussed approaches are limited to ‘show the political sources that 
systematically bias public decisions toward larger than efficient projects in the 
area of distributive policy making’ (Weingast et al. 1981). This means that a 
distributive policy is restricted to ‘a political decision that concentrates benefits 
in a specific geographic constituency and finances expenditure through 
generalized taxation’ (Ibid.) 
 The consequence of taking this approach for territorial analysis is that 
allows analysing the side effects of intergovernmental political economy. 
Considering that ‘geography is the hallmark of distributive politics’ (Weingast 
et al. 1981), redistribution will be examined at a territory level. Within the 
proposed framework, a [re]distributive policy has a geographic incidence 
explicitly targeted, in contrast to a non-distributive program which can be 
accessible to all the individuals across the territories in the entitled category.  
In parallel, geography is considered to be the basis for political 
organization and representation. Local representatives do care about who gains 
and who loses in proportion to their geographic location. Both categories of 
actors: central government and local governments have incentives to increase 
public spending beyond the efficient point at the local level due to electoral 
competition. 
 
Territorial inequality and intergovernmental finances 
 
Public finance models tend to assume that the economy operates only in two 
levels: the ‘macro-economy’ of the nation state, and the ‘micro-economy’ of 
individual firms and households (Martin 2003). This dichotomy has the risk of 
diminishing the role of the differing economic structures, dynamics and 
institutional arrangements that space encompasses. 
However, uneven development does not only mean different outcomes 
from public spending in different territories: it can compromise the macro-
economic management and can counter the outcomes intended through it 
(Martin 2003). 
Territorialization comes to discussion due to a broad context of state 
reforms, where there is an increasing consciousness of territories as 
instruments of action (Boudreau 2003). From this perspective, the territory is 
not only defined as an area to be governed or controlled, it is used as an 
instrument to attain a broader goal (Ibid). Under this logic, state spatial 
strategies (Brener 2001, Harvey 1985 Boudreau 2003) are ‘designed to 
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influence economic development and political struggles into specific structural 
coherence of spatial fix’. 
From this stand, the analysis of public policies has to consider a new 
division of power between governing units, bearing in mind the place-based 
social relations that can affect the intended outcomes. Recent work deals with 
the analysis of state spatial strategies, with the aim of understanding the 
processes of spatial selectivity when designing local and/or regional policies (a 
survey of related literature can be found in Boudreau 2003, 185). 
Consequently, the scope of public finances to equalize territorial 
development depends on the ability to understand spatial patterns of 
concentration of economic activity. In the analysis of regions, territorial 
inequalities present a relevant sphere for policy design, since they reveal the 
underlying power structures and have the potential to challenge individualistic 
explanations of inequality and social struggle. 
However, there is a clear-cut point of intervention, when redistributing by 
means of public finances: differential capacity to provide public services. 
Regardless of a lack of consensus on the sources of territorial inequalities, a 
redistributive notion of social justice had been adopted in the orthodox 
economics, in which justice is advanced by an equitable sharing of economic 
and social gains among people living in all areas (Rodriguez-Oreggia and 
Rodríguez-Pose 2004).  
Moreover, when a comprehensive taxation is not a viable option in the 
local political structure, public spending takes the leading territorial 
redistributive role. The norm should follow the argument of improving the 
distribution of economic welfare nationwide through public spending. And the 
redistributive response through public spending generally reacts to: (1) 
‘dissatisfaction with distributional outcomes in the absence of intervention’: 
market failures deepened by social norms, (2) ‘lack of alternative policy 
instruments’: when comprehensive income taxes are generally not a viable 
option, and (3) ‘need for fiscal restraint and the sharp trade-offs this makes 
governments face’: targeted provision of public services, selective choice of 
beneficiaries due to financial limitations (Walle et al. 1995). 
2.2 Empirical work on intergovernmental finances 
In this section, I will explore different analytical approaches that can be 
considered in order to analyse the determinant of intra-government finances, 
namely in this case, transfers from central government to municipalities. The 
aim of the analysis is to evaluate the impact of political forces, and/or the 
relevance of normative concerns in the allocation of transfers in Ecuador. 
We presented fiscal federalism as a normative approach, which assumes 
that the central government is motivated by efficiency and equity goals, with 
the broader objective of maximizing the welfare of the population. Along with 
normative approaches, public choice theory assumes, in the contrary, that 
politicians attempt to promote their own interest. We also mentioned that the 
political support framework, within the public choice theory, seeks to deal with 
interest groups and their influence in government choices. For this particular 
case, models on rational opportunistic political budgetary cycles (Veiga and 
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Pinho 2007) and extra-electoral policy making (Grossman and Helpman 1994, 
Gawande and Li 2009) will be tested. 
Previous work on political business cycles (a detailed survey of this 
literature can be found in Veiga and Pinho 2007) dates back to the 1970s, with 
Nordhays (1975) and Lindbeck (1976). They used probabilistic voting models 
in order to show how incumbents can manipulate the economy before 
elections. For this purpose, they made use of an expectations augmented 
Phillips curve, concerning unemployment in pre and pro election periods. 
Later work from Rogoff and Sivert (1988) used signalling models of the 
rationality of pre-electoral manipulation. Recently, Person and Tabellini (2004) 
analyse how a country can discourage the emergency of budgetary electoral 
cycles. They found that the existence of political budgetary cycles depends on 
electoral rules and forms of government. 
Similarly, previous work on tactical redistribution (Ibid) dates back to 1986, 
with the work of Cox and McCubbins related with risk-averse political 
candidates and its relation with close supporters. Dahlberg and Johansson 
(2002) tested the prediction of Cox and McCubbins (1986) in Sweden, finding 
no evidence of their model. Quite the opposite, they found that the proposal 
of Lindeck and Weibull (1987) was more likely to happen: the winning policy 
favours voters with weak party preferences. 
In this paper, I test the above mentioned models of budgetary cycles using 
the Rogoff and Sibert (1998) framework, in which majors lobby the central 
government to receive a larger amount of funds during election years) and 
tactical redistribution (I apply the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework 
for lobby groups). Due to theoretical reasons exposed before and enhanced by 
data constraints, I am going to focus only on extra-electoral policy making. 
Models of voting competitions are beyond the scope of this research. 
Empirical setting 
Dynamic model: path dependency, budgetary cycles, and normative 
concerns 
 
In this section I am going to present the empirical strategy intended to 
investigate the political and socio-economic aspects of transfer distribution in 
Ecuador. This method is driven by the work The political economy of 
intergovernmental grants: evidence from a maturing democracy (Veiga and Pinho 2007).  
Following the aforementioned method, I model real per capita transfers to 
municipalities as a function of (1) lags of the dependent variable, considering 
that transfer schemes are path dependent and therefore, are likely to persist 
over time; (2) a vector of variables related with political factors, such as 
political budgetary cycles (before and during election years), and presence of 
lobby groups (taking into account the pressure of these interest groups to 
influence policy outcomes);  and (3) a vector of control variables associated 
with the normative approach, i.e. social welfare maximization, both trough 
efficiency and equity. 
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The dependent variable: share of [capital and current] transfers; is 
modelled in real values, deflated according to the annual [consumption] price 
index. Logarithms are also applied, to linearize the relationship with the 
explanatory variables and examine whether marginal changes in them have 
multiplicative effects on the dependent variable. 
The vector of variables related with the political factors, tests for: (1) 
political budgetary cycles, by the analysis of dummy year variables, keeping in 
mind the election years and specially, the previous year election value. The 
argument is that municipalities can lobby the central governments before 
election years in order to increase local public investment (or what (Collier 
2007) calls ‘the survival of the fattest’). (2) We could also test for Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) model for political support. For this purpose, I will 
outline the interest groups. One alternative is to look at industry lobbies 
(Gawande and Li 2009). And within each sector, I look at the human capital 
(i.e. share of population working in a specific sector6).  Theoretically, the 
human capital measure is taken to be exogenous because it is technologically 
constant (i.e. it is fairly constant over time (Gawande and Li 2009)). Even 
more, industrial concentration is an important determinant of collective action 
and correlated with political organization (Ibid).  This second alternative will 
make use of a fixed effects model, due to data availability, and will be described 
later in this paper. 
As aforementioned, transfers to municipalities are considered path 
dependent, and therefore, conditional to their lagged values. The rationale is 
that for politicians it is difficult to reduce the previous levels of transfers 
without facing political restraints. Additionally, the amount of transfers from 
the central government can be considered responsive to the level of public 
credit, meaning that municipalities that depend on public credit are more 
highly dependent on central government’ transfers. The opposite case takes 
place when municipalities are able to collect local taxes, and rely on tax 
revenues reducing the dependency on central government’s transfers. 
In what it concerns to the normative approach (and following Veiga and 
Pinho 2007), central government transfers should consider demographic, 
economic, and time variables. Differences in funds requirements, due to 
population size, include: population in thousands and population squared. The 
rationale in the inclusion of this variable is that the existence of economies of 
scale in the provision of public services, where the cost is supposed to decrease 
as the local population increases. Therefore, in order to promote horizontal 
equity the central government should transfer fewer resources to larger 
municipalities since they are able to provide identical public services at a lower 
level of taxation. Additional controls for natural regions (Coast, Amazon and 
Highlands included, reference region Islands) and metropolitan districts (Quito 
and Guayaquil). 
                                                
6 To simplify the model, I can assume that the employed population is organized as 
lobbies, as stated in Gawande,K. (2009). 
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Finally, to test for the macroeconomic performance of the country I 
included oil prices series. This follows the abovementioned dependence of 
Ecuadorian economy on its [resource] revenues. A positive sign is expected for 
this variable, coming from what economic theory suggests and sector specific 
legal framework changes7. 
 
2.2...1 Model specification 
For this particular case of linear dynamic panel-data models, p lags of the 
dependent variable are included as covariates and contain unobserved panel-
level effects, fixed or random. Since the unobserved panel-level effects are 
correlated with the lagged dependent variables, standard estimators may be 
inconsistent. This can be verified by taking a naive approach to model 
transfers. It is described in the Equation (1), in which I simply pooled the data 
of the i municipalities over the t years, in order to apply OLS: 
 
Equation 1 
 =∝  + 	 +  +  + μ 
i = 1,… ,N; 	t = 1,… , T	
 
However, with this procedure the estimates will be biased and 
inconsistent, since μ includes unobservable fixed factors (ai) that stay 
constant through time for each i but are correlated with the explanatory 
variable (unobserved heterogeneity). [For a detailed explanation of panel data 
methods, see Wooldridge 2009 ,Chapter 13]. 
To solve this problem, and considering that the main reason to collect 
panel data is to allow for the unobserved effect (ai) to be correlated with the 
explanatory variables, I difference the data across the years. 
 
Equation 2 
∆ = ∆∝  + ∆	 + ∆ + ∆μ 
i=1,…,N; t=1,…,T	
 
But this would imply that I must assume that ∆μ is uncorrelated over 
time with the explanatory variables in each time period, for the usual standard 
                                                
7 As stated in the official document ‘Lineamientos de la Política Económica 2011-
2013’ ( Ministerio de Coordinación de la Política Económica 2011: 13), the 
sovereignty in the administration of natural resources has allowed to an increase on 
social expenditure and public investment when compared with previous regimes. This 
is evidenced in the upsurge of oil revenues from 2006 (year in which the Ecuadorian 
State modified the sectorial normative in order to increase the participation in oil 
revenues); and the sharp increase from 2008 onwards, due to the dissolution of the 
contingency funds and its provision to the National Budget. 
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errors and test statistics to be valid. Consequently, I can use lagged values of 
the dependent variables as instruments, assuming that past should not be 
affected by future shocks. This new model is described in the Equation 3, 
where: 
 
Equation 3 
 =$%&,'
'
&(
+ _ +  + * 	
i=1,…,N; t=1,…,T 
 
Transfers are a functions of its lagged values ∑ %&,''&( , political 
factors _ and normative factors . The model is specified for T 
periods and N observations (municipalities). However, the lagged value of the 
dependent variable would be correlated with the error term due to the 
dominance of cross sections (N=219) over time periods (T=10) in the sample 
(following the rationale described in Veiga and Pinho 2007) 
The model can be estimated using a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM). Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a GMM estimator that first 
differences the individual effects and the resulting equation becomes estimable 
by instrumental variables (Veiga and Pinho 2007). Later, Blundell and Bond 
(1998) developed a system estimator that uses additional moment conditions, 
in order to exploit new moment conditions for the data in levels while 
retaining original conditions from the transformed equation (Roodman 2006). 
Additionally, in a system GMM time-invariant regressors can be included, 
which would disappear from a differenced GMM. 
The system GMM embodies the subsequent assumptions, as found in 
Roodman (2006): 
1. The process may be dynamic, where current values of the dependent 
variable (transfers) are influenced by past ones. 
2. The idiosyncratic disturbances may have individual-specific patterns of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
3. The idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated across individuals. 
4. Some regressors may be predetermined but not strictly exogenous: 
independent of current disturbances they may be influenced by past 
ones. For this application, tax earnings are modelled as predetermined. 
5. The number of time periods of available data T, may be small. 
 
Fixed Effects Model: testing for the influence of lobby groups 
 
Unfortunately, to assess the relationship between poverty and 
intergovernmental finances at the canton level, I can only rely on census data. 
Also, information on lobby groups at the municipality level (in this case, I am 
considering the share of workers within each interest group) is reliable only 
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from national census data. Therefore, a fixed effects model of two periods is 
adapted in order to test for the political support framework. 
 
2.2...1 Model specification 
The model tries to exploit the endogenous transfers’ placement at the local 
level. The questioned criteria for local public spending: (1) political factors 
captured by support or interest groups (2) normative factors: mainly related to 
poverty together with socio-demographic characteristics and (3) 
macroeconomic performance (oil prices) 
 
Equation 4 
 = $

+$, +  + -

 
i=1,…,N; t=1,2 
 
Where  is the per capita value of transfers from the central 
government to municipalities in the time t,  groups the political 
factors,  groups the normative criteria stated before. Under this 
specification,  describes time invariant unmeasured attributes and - the 
random time-varying error. 
I estimate the fixed effects model by pooling the data from two periods. 
The most important feature is that  has disappeared and the assumption that 
./ is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables is not necessary. The time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity is therefore, no problematic. On the other 
hand, when using fixed effects I am only comparing the before-after difference 
on the share of per capita transfers of those municipalities who accessed it.  
The assumptions for the fixed effects model follows: 
1. For each i the model is  = ∑  +∑ , +
. + - , 0 = 1,2 where the  , , 	2	3 are the parameters to 
estimate and  is the unobserved effect. 
2. We have a random sample from the cross section 
3. Each explanatory variable changes over time (for at least some i), and 
no perfect linear relationships exist among the explanatory variables 
4. For the fixed effects model: strictly exogenous conditional on the 
unobserved effect [once controled for   there is no correlation 
between the xisj and the remaining idiosyncratic error - , 
E(-|Xi,	)=0]. Under these four assumptions, the fixed effects 
model is unbiased. 
5. Var(-|Xi,	)=Var(-) for all t=1,…,T 
6. The idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated (conditional on all explanatory 
variables and % . Under these set of assumptions, the FEM estimator 
is BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator). 
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Chapter 3 Context 
This chapter will introduce the Ecuadorian context. Ecuador has shifted 
towards a more humanistic development paradigm: Buen Vivir , ‘Good living’ 
or ‘living well’; adopted as an orienting concept of the new Constitution 
(passed in popular referendum, in 2008). Buen Vivir seeks a new interrelation of 
beings and knowledge(s): ‘buen vivir denotes, organizes, and constructs a system 
of knowledge and living based on the communion of humans and nature on 
the spatial-temporal-harmonious totality of existence’ (Walsh 2010 emphasis 
added). 
The design for the application of Buen Vivir is detailed in the National 
Plan of Development (Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir 2009-2013), developed by 
the National Secretariat of Planning and Development (SENPLADES). And 
what makes this document the umbrella norm regarding my analysis is its focus 
on ‘decentralization and deconcentration of power’8. In this document, 
territorial equity is a core question. As a result, the abovementioned shift in the 
conception and application of territories for national planning is what motivate 
me to look at the Ecuadorian case as a thought-provoking one, when analysing 
intergovernmental relationships.  
In addition, and since the Plan is based on an analytical diagnosis of the 
evolution of economic, social, and political processes that illustrate the 
country’s failed9 development in the last decades, I am going to introduce these 
processes in the forthcoming subchapters. The Plan refers to an ‘excluding 
social contract in Republican Ecuador’. I am looking at the uneven regional 
development in particular, in the following section. 
3.1 Uneven territorial development: the Ecuadorian case 
A territorial approach has recently been adopted in Ecuador. It seeks to 
identify ‘specific functionalities, articulating complementarities in order to 
promote equal access to opportunities, by means of promoting synergies 
across different geographic spaces, circumscribed in an endogenous strategy’ 
(República del Ecuador 2009). This approach rejects competitiveness across 
spaces and places; on the contrary, it encourages complementarities.  
The Ecuadorian strategy for territorial development and organization, 
deconcentration, and decentralization; proposes ‘mechanisms to transform the 
Ecuadorian territory, as well as to promote a (re)distribution of wealth among 
and between the territories’10. For that reason, public policy must be based in 
coordination between government agencies at different territorial levels, 
pursuing complementarities and synergies. 
                                                
8 http://www.senplades.gob.ec/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=e1f159cb-e84c-
4f88-a857-0188b7a4c1b5&groupId=18607 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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The territorial strategy stated in the Plan, encompasses a polycentric, 
articulated, and complementary national territorial structure. This means that 
territories are conceived as spaces with specific functions, but always 
promoting domestic integration.  
Nevertheless, when looking at the historical and relational diagnosis of the 
Ecuadorian geography (Ibid), clear signs of dualism, polarization, asymmetries, 
uneven development strategies, and regional diverging forces can be identified. 
All of them challenge the territorial strategy proposed, carrying elements of a 
persistent unequal territorial setting. 
Regionalism in Ecuador 
Regionalism constitutes a central feature of Ecuadorian politics (Clark and 
Becker 2007). Regional divisions have a notable impact in citizen-state relations 
and political developments (Ibid). In this section, I will briefly present the 
historical and relational diagnosis of regionalism in Ecuador. 
Ecuador is composed of four [geographic or natural] regions: the tropical 
Pacific coastal lowlands area centred around the city of Guayaquil, the 
temperate Sierra highlands around the capital city of Quito, the eastern upper 
Amazon basin (Oriente) where oil production takes place at the present time, 
and the Galápagos archipelago. This regional divide rooted in the geographical 
composition of the country, and studied by authors like Hurtado (1977), Pineo 
(1996)11, Acosta (2006), Kim (2007), among others; appears to have deepened 
political and cultural divisions (Clark and Becker 2007): ‘Until well into the 
twentieth century, economically and demographically the highlands dominated 
the rest of the country’. Before the Spanish conquest, the Inca civilization gave 
particular preference to the highlands, provoking the exclusion of the coastal 
and Amazon regions. Later in time, and due to the export-led economic 
growth based on large scale plantations, a demographic shift took place: rural 
workers from the Sierra highlands began to migrate to the coast12 (Ibid).  
And the historical roots of regionalism persist up to present. The regional 
divide continues to be a central feature of politics: ‘Regional disputes have 
been an important source of social and political instability in Ecuador 
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Ecuador’s main political parties are 
formed along regional lines, weakening central authority and forcing a style of 
policy making that allocates resources, taxes, and quotas of political power in 
an effort to maintain regional balance’ (Beckerman 2002) 
Dualism in Ecuador 
As part of the mentioned geographical patterns: dualism, points to the critical 
character of nodes into shaping the national space fix. This dualism is 
                                               
11 An interesting synthesis of his work and related with state building problematic can 
be found in (Martz 1997) 
12 By the 1970s, more people lived on the coast than in the highlands, with less than 
four per cent living in the Amazon (Beckerman 2002). 
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illustrated in the supremacy of the two biggest cities in Ecuador: Quito and 
Guayaquil as centres of dynamism and economic activities, with particular 
flows and forces shaping the economic geography. Quito has a political pre-
eminence, as the political centre. The coastal city of Guayaquil constitutes the 
‘economic engine’ of the country. Together, these two cities concentrate 30 per 
cent of the national population (Ibid) but almost 70 per cent of the domestic 
economic activity13. Not surprisingly, this dual setting is perceived as an 
outcome of historical privileges towards these nodes in an intra-urban dynamic 
converging towards a metropolis biased setting, as stated in the referenced 
source.  
Sources of [territorial] inequality in Ecuador 
A recent study conducted by Ponce (2010), analyses the evolution of inequality 
in Ecuador, in the last decade. The author founds a ‘dividing wall’ between the 
types of economic growth associated with inequality changes. His argument is 
that during the 1990s the country experienced low but pro-rich, economic 
growth. On the contrary, better levels of economic growth experienced during 
the 2000s were also reinforced with a pro-poor shift in policies. 
The previous contrast in the type of economic growth attained in Ecuador 
finds evidence in the increasing inequality over the past decade, where the Gini 
coefficient (over per capita income) increased from 0.48 per cent in 1990 to 
0.58 in 2000. The total series is presented in the subsequent figure. 
 
Figure 1 Gini coefficient (over per capita income), 1990-2010 
 
Source: Ponce 201114 Elaboration: the author 
                                               
13 A recent article by Fernando Carrión Mena “Bicentralismo y Bicefalía Urbana” in 
Diario Hoy (2011) announced that the two cities comprise 69.3% of the domestic 
economic activity. 
14 Ponce (2010) 
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It is possible to identify how the financial crisis (1999) deepened income 
inequality. However, up to that point the inequality had been increasing due to 
the liberalization of the economy (Ponce 2010). 
Still, inequality in Ecuador has different sources as acknowledged in 
context related literature. It follows a condensed list of the sources identified: 
 
Labour market based  
 
Wage gaps reinforced by trade liberalization can be identified as a cumulative 
source of inequality in Ecuador. Structurally, there is a persistent reduction in 
the number of labourers employed in the modern sector of the economy, 
especially across the poorest deciles (Ponce 2010).  
 
Figure 2 Labour market composition, 2010  
 
 
Source: SIISE-MCDS 
 
 During the 1990s, the share of fully employed workers fell from around 
50 per cent to 40 per cent in 2006. This can be correlated with an increase in 
underemployment for the same period, from 49 per cent at the beginning of 
the last decade, to 62 per cent in 2006. In conclusion, there is acceptance of the 
idea of a contraction in the modern sector, founded in an enlarged informality 
in the economy. 
 
  
Informal ; 47.53%
3.42% 4.48%
12.06%
32.51%
Formal (modern); 
44.57%
Informal Domestic services Other Public Private
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Figure 3 Labour market in Ecuador: unemployment,  
underemployment, and employment, 1993-2006  
 
Source: INEC, Ponce 2010 
 
Considering that there is evidence about an increase in the informal sector, 
it is important to point that it has been accompanied with the related wage gap, 
when compared to the modern sector. Overall, this wage divide in the labour 
market has the disadvantageous potentiality of depressing the aggregate 
demand and therefore, is likely to inhibit [domestic] economic growth. 
 
Figure 4 Share of workers in the modern sector (urban) 
 
Source: Ponce 2011 Adaptation: The author 
 
The export sector occupies mainly qualified workers, who are, on average, 
four years ahead in schooling compared to workers occupied in the non-
tradable (i.e. domestic only) sector of the economy (República del Ecuador 
2009). With an export led strategy, the situation for low skilled workers is likely 
to worsen.  
 
  
Decile 1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2006 2010
Poorest 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.41 0.43 0.33 0.13
2 0.53 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.42 0.32 0.24
3 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.45 0.47 0.40 0.30
4 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.41 0.35
5 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.41
6 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.48 0.55 0.49 0.46
7 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.52
8 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.56
9 0.57 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.63
Richest 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.74
Total (urban) 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.48
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Figure 5 Schooling, working population average (from 25 to 55 years old) 
 
Source: Ponce 2011 Adaptation: The author 
 
As a consequence of this modern vis a vis informal dichotomy (Acosta 
1995), there is a strong indication that Ecuador endogenously ‘generates and 
reproduces its own problems in a process of circular cumulative causation’ (as 
Acosta 1995 refers to the thesis developed by Myrdal 1963). The mechanism 
explained to support this thesis follows: (1) a marginal informal sector with low 
capital productivity faces constraints to invest due to lack of resources, (2) this 
informal sector interacts in the same field with a modern sector that has high 
capital productivity and consequently, occupies a lower labour share; (3) 
investment is doubly constrained since the modern sector has slight incentives 
to direct its efforts to the domestic economy, thus, (4) the informal/modern 
dichotomy replicates and deepens through time. Exchange of technology 
across these sectors, qualified labour force, infrastructure improvements is less 
likely to happen if the structure remains unchanged.  
 
Highly concentrated markets: 
 
Related with the previously identified source of inequality, it is central to point 
out that a large share of the market is controlled by a few enterprises that 
engage in oligopoly like activities. Consequently, the unequal market power 
induces anti-competitive behaviour: lack of transparency and below-
equilibrium remuneration to its workers: ‘it has limited real competitive 
conditions; and obstructed transparent market practices and the expansion of 
formal, well-compensated, and inclusive labour demand’ (República del Ecuador 
2009). 
 
  
Decile 1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2006 2010
Poorest 7.00 7.20 8.10 7.50 7.40 7.70 8.50
2 7.90 7.50 8.00 7.70 7.70 8.20 9.10
3 7.40 8.00 8.00 8.60 8.60 8.50 9.30
4 7.80 8.20 8.80 8.90 8.90 9.40 10.20
5 8.40 8.80 9.20 9.00 9.20 10.10 10.40
6 8.90 9.00 9.80 9.00 9.80 11.00 11.60
7 9.00 9.70 10.40 10.30 10.50 12.50 13.00
8 10.30 10.60 11.40 10.90 11.50 14.00 13.50
9 11.10 11.40 12.40 12.50 12.70 15.40 15.90
Richest 12.60 13.30 13.40 13.90 14.60 18.00 18.10
Total (urban) 9.40 9.70 10.40 10.30 10.60 12.20 12.60
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Table 1 Industrial concentration 2005 (Gini coefficient)  
Description Beverages(1) Milk Products(2) Trade(3) Hotels(4) Construction(5) 
Sales 0,9651 0.9507 0.9411 0,8828 0,8015 
Assets 0,9519 0.9434 0,9412 0,9211 0,8948 
(1)
 31 companies of which seven reported no sales 
(2)
 97 companies of which 46 reported no sales 
(3)
 80 companies of which 18 reported no sales 
(4)
 First one hundred companies in sales 
(5)
 First one companies in sales 
 
In addition, the industrial concentration in Ecuador is not only verified 
within sectors, it has also a territorial dimension. Economic factors [e.g. 
consequences of structural adjustments, financial crises, export-oriented 
strategies, and dollarization process] have conditioned the territorial 
arrangement of activities. For instance, Quito is the residence of the biggest 
private bank of the country, and legal residence of flower exporter companies, 
retailers, press and communication companies. Guayaquil, the coastal port, 
hosts important economic groups, related with exportation/importation 
sectors. This concentration has consequences in the nationwide redistribution 
of resources, due to political economy restraints reinforced by lobby groups 
located in better-off areas. 
An instance of this can be verified when decomposing the added value at 
the province level, using province accounts (BCE)15. There are signals of a 
territorial concentration of productive activities. Together, Pichincha (where 
the capital is located, location of the government) and Guayas (principal port 
of the country, financial and exporter centre) account for 45 per cent of the 
added value at the province level. The Amazon provinces (especially 
Sucumbíos and Francisco de Orellana), where most of the oil production takes 
place, account for 23 per cent of the added value (in the period of analysis, the 
decrease in 2 points for Sucumbíos has been taken by an proportional increase 
in the production in Francisco de Orellana). 
 
  
                                                
15 Data on oil production uses international prices, conversely to data on oil 
processing that uses domestic prices; consequently this is the reason of the negative 
sign in the added value for Esmeraldas, province in which the biggest share of oil and 
gas refineries is located. A detailed description of province accounting methodology 
can be found in 
http://www.bce.fin.ec/documentos/Estadisticas/SectorReal/CuentasProvinciales/A
nexo.pdf 
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Figure 6 Province accounts: added value (US$)  
` 
Source: BCE Elaboration: the author 
 
However, when comparing the added value at the province level without 
including oil production, the territorial pattern changes, except for the pre-
eminence of Pichincha and Guayas (which in this case account for 52 per cent 
of the national value in 2001 and increased to 55 per cent in 2006). 
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Figure 7 Province accounts: added value (US$) without oil production  
 
Source: BCE Elaboration: the author 
 
Targeted social policy 
 
Budget pressures were stated as the main argument to target fiscal resources 
for social programs during the 1990s (República del Ecuador 2009). However, 
during the same period important shares of fiscal resources were allocated to 
the private sector, due to politic interest underlying policy making: 
 
 ‘The contradiction is evident. If, on one hand, the budget for the social 
sector was decreased and the focus set on reducing the fiscal deficit; on the 
other hand, there was a continuous flow of support filtered to the private 
sector. This caused a perverse effect by increasing the fiscal deficit, that is, the 
opposite effect to that postulated in neoclassical economics (Ibid)16.  
 
                                                
16 This observation applies before the financial crises and consequent dollarization of 
the economy. 
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As a consequence of these contradictory practices, the fiscal deficit 
increased during the neoliberal period, together with a less than moderate 
impact in the social sector. ‘This is how inequality is explained in relation to the 
few resources destined to social investment, to expenditure cuts… and 
inefficiency in focusing on social emergency programs that never promoted 
social mobility. As a result, the “new” social policy had almost no impact either 
on poverty or on the population’s wellbeing’ (Vos et al. 2000, Vos et al. 2003,  
República del Ecuador 2009). 
Nonetheless, recent trends in social investment are aimed to break that 
tendency: the share of social investment respect to GDP increase from 4.7 per 
cent in 2006 to 7.2 in 2009. 
 
Figure 8 Evolution of social investment in relation to GDP. Ecuador, 1999-2009 
 
Source: BCE Adaptation: the author 
 
Unequal access to land 
 
As a heritage from the Colonial times, fertile land has been highly concentrated 
(with a land Gini coefficient of 0.76817). And from the same historical roots, 
exploitative and low remunerated labour established as a common practice in 
the countryside. Additionally, owners of export oriented crops were closely 
related to the financial sector, benefiting disproportionally from their 
privileges. (República del Ecuador 2009). 
Land inequality has also a territorial dimension. There are intra and inter 
regional differences in the resources available for agricultural and livestock 
production. For instance, (Clark and Becker 2007) accounts the intraregional 
divide for the Sierra region:  
 
                                                
17 Data obtained in online document: 
http://www.siise.gov.ec/Publicaciones/2inf10.pdf (SIISE - Ecuador) 
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‘the northern highlands (Carchi, Imbabura, Pichincha, and Cotopaxi 
provinces) have the most fertile and productive lands … The central highland 
provinces (Tungurahua, Chimborazo, and Bolívar) have similar characteristics 
but with smaller agricultural and livestock zones than the north. Finally, the 
southern provinces (Cañar, Azuay, and Loja) have less fertile, more volcanic 
soil, with fewer possibilities for agricultural development’.  
 
The Coast and Amazon regions exhibit diverging patterns in land 
ownership, both in extension and quality. Important as this topic on land 
disparities is to explain territorial dimensions of inequality, it is beyond the 
particular scope of this research. 
3.2 Inequality and poverty interactions: regional balance in 
development 
Some authors find evidence that high inequality not only translates into higher 
absolute income poverty, it also lessens the poverty-reducing impact of 
economic growth (Mendoza‐Botelho 2011). In this section, I am going to 
assess whether that is also the case for Ecuador. For this purpose, I contrasted 
poverty reduction and inequality changes, at the city level (i.e. urban only, due 
to data availability). The graph shows the harmful effect of the financial crisis 
(1999), both in poverty and inequality. And more importantly, it presents an 
increment on inequality (i.e. increase in the Gini coefficient) together with 
poverty reduction. 
 
Figure 9 Evolution of poverty and inequality (Ecuador, urban data) 
 
Source: Ramírez (Ramírez Gallegos 2008) Adaptation: the author 
 
Hitherto, this poverty reduction in Ecuador ‘is not associated with any 
structural transformation oriented both to employment generation and 
inequality reduction’ (República del Ecuador 2009). On the contrary, some 
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authors claim that the central source of poverty reduction in Ecuador is mainly 
linked to favourable oil prices and remittances18 (Ponce et al. 2010, Ponce and 
Acosta 2010).  
Additionally, the poverty-reducing impact of economic growth has not 
been equally distributed across the national territory. Analysis on territorial 
inequality conducted during the last decade (Ramírez Gallegos 2008) present 
evidence of a territorial divide in poverty reduction. Basic needs poverty 
reduction, accounted from 1990 to 2001, achieved greater results in already 
better off areas (the author accounts this effect at the parish level). This 
renders in persistent poverty of remote areas and a lessened effect of poverty 
reduction policies. 
Moreover, social policy in Ecuador has been perceived as subsidiary and 
assistance oriented; failing to achieve factual wealth redistribution, together 
with transforming economic policies: ‘the “new” social policy had almost no 
impact either on poverty or on the population’s wellbeing’ (as found in the 
English version document of the PNBV 2009-2013, República del Ecuador 
2009) 
Regional balance of inequality in Ecuador 
From the census data it is not possible to directly estimate income and 
consumption variables. As a consequence, inequality measures such as the Gini 
coefficient are not directly obtainable. Nevertheless, the World Bank used data 
from household surveys (1999) and extrapolated it to the census data (2001), in 
order to obtain a canton based consumption poverty line. A [consumption] 
poverty head count is then estimated for each municipality, except for those in 
the Amazon region, where province data is not available.19 And, using an 
estimated value of consumption, a Gini coefficient was obtained at the canton 
level20. The results show the highlands as the most unequal region of the 
country, since most of the municipalities with higher inequality in consumption 
belong to this region. Unfortunately, the lack of data about the Amazon region 
can lead to partial understanding of the territorial dimension of inequality and 
its impact in poverty reduction.  
A territorial analysis of inequality that includes data on the Amazon region 
can be found in the report on the Millennium Development Goals, conducted 
in Ecuador by the United Nations Development Program, and accompanied 
by government organizations and members of the academia. Likewise, there 
are no province values on Gini coefficient for the Amazon region, although 
the regional average is certainly higher than the national value. As mentioned 
                                                
18 This argument will be developed at more detail in the section related with fiscal 
vulnerability. 
19 The lack of accurate information for the Amazon is in a large extent cause and 
consequence of the lagged state-led development of this region. 
20 Later on, Ponce (2006) used World Bank results to analyze the relationship between 
poverty and inequality. The author finds a positive direct association between the Gini 
coefficient and the incidence of [consumption] poverty at the canton level. 
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before, the lack of disaggregated data for the Amazonia follows the design of 
household surveys that fail to reach remote [Amazon] areas in the national 
territory. In spite of those methodological elements, the data reveals that the 
overall value of inequality obtained for the Amazon region is five points over 
the national average (0.46). This inequality has detrimental consequences for 
the region, at the economic and social levels1.  
 
Table 2 Consumption Gini coefficient, province level 
Province Gini 
Los Ríos 0,36 
Cañar 0,38 
El Oro 0,39 
Guayas 0,42 
Tungurahua 0,42 
Cotopaxi 0,43 
Esmeraldas 0,44 
Azuay 0,44 
Imbabura 0,44 
Bolívar 0,45 
Pichincha 0,46 
Carchi 0,47 
Chimborazo 0,48 
Loja 0,48 
Amazon region 0,51 
Manabí 0,54 
National 0,46 
Source: UNDP, 2010 
 
To sum things up, I present the recent work on spatial economics applied 
to the Ecuadorian context, from a new economic geography perspective21.  
The Inter-American Development Bank (2006) in Ecuador conducted a spatial 
decomposition of inequality. The authors (Azevedo et al. 2008)  examined the 
spatial sources of inequality: intra/inter group based, applying methods 
developed by Shorrocks (1984) and Jenkins (1995)22. The results display that in 
Ecuador, 10 per cent of the overall consumption based inequality is due to the 
inter-province disparities; 20 per cent corresponds to inter-cantonal disparities; 
30 per cent from parish disparities; and 45 per cent from inter-zone disparities. 
On the basis of their results, the authors make a claim for geographical 
targeting of social programs, in order to reduce inter-group inequality and 
tackle the overall measure of inequality in the country.  
Regional balance of poverty reduction in Ecuador 
A regional balance of poverty can be demonstrated by means Kernel density 
estimation, a non-parametric estimation of the probability density function23 
                                               
21 Referring to Neoclassical space-economy, like orthodox quantitative geography and 
regional equilibrium theory, as found in Weberian (1960s) location theory, Krugman 
(1991) locational events analysis 
22 As stated in the referenced source. 
23 http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?kdensity 
 37
for basic needs poverty at the canton level; comparing the base year values 
(from 2001) with the changes in poverty incidence for 2010. It gives the 
impression that there is an overall reduction on the poverty rate, especially for 
those municipalities near to the average value. Yet, and since I am using simple 
averages collated from the parish level and using both urban and rural values 
(as provided by the MCDS), it is important to point out that the benefits of 
poverty reduction vary greatly across cantons, deepening in some cases (where 
the orange dashed line is superior to the green line from 2001).  
 
Figure 10 Kernel density estimation: basic needs poverty incidence 2001-2010  
 
Source: INEC-MCDS Elaboration: the author 
 
Using the longitudinal features of the data gathered, I present below a 
compacted analysis of transition probabilities [at the canton level] on poverty 
incidence variation for the period of study, to explore whether at the canton 
level there is a dissimilar performance in poverty reduction. 
 
Table 3 Poverty incidence (basic needs approach) transition probabilities at the 
canton level, period 2001-2010  
Transition probabilities for poverty* 
Poor 0 1 Total 
0 89.42 10.58 100 
1 19.13 80.87 100 
Total 52.51 47.49 100 
* where the poor municipalities are those over the 
median value, just for methodological purposes 
Source: INEC, MCDS Elaboration: the author 
 
For the 47.49 per cent of the municipalities in the sample that were ever in 
poverty, 80.87 per cent remained in poverty in 2010 (a fictional poverty line 
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was established, equivalent to the mean value: 76.35 for 2001 and 75.90 for 
201024). 
I obtained a dot comparison across provinces as well, trying to understand 
better the territorial divide in poverty reduction. Again, some attention should 
be considered regarding the use of simple averages at the province level, not 
weighted by grouped canton/parish population. Regardless of that 
observation, there is some evidence of digging poverty among the Amazon 
provinces (Orellana, Pastaza, Sucumbíos; concurrent element with oil 
production location).  
 
Figure 11 Poverty incidence, province level. 2001-2010 
 
Source: INEC, MCDS Elaboration: the author 
 
Below I introduce a ranking of canton level poverty incidence (using the 
basic needs approach), comparing data from 2001 with the most recent census 
data, corresponding to 2010. On the whole, despite a decade of equalizing 
territorial investment in human capital and social infrastructure, polarization 
patterns persist. In other words, remote areas of the Amazon region are 
persistently poor, in contrast to the already better off municipalities back in 
2001, which are mainly province capitals located in the highlands and relatively 
close to the national capital. The Galapagos archipelago also exhibit low 
                                                
24 I also constructed a table using the median and percentile 60, presenting similar 
behaviour. Although I preferred the probability transitions calculated over the mean 
value, I am presenting the mean value following its use as the common threshold 
considered in the Ecuadorian public sector to target resources to deprived areas.  
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poverty rates over time, although they are considered a special regime when it 
comes to territorial national planning.  
 
Table 4 Incidence of basic needs poverty 2001-2010 (share %, canton level)  
 
Source: INEC and MCDS Elaboration: the author 
 
The data provided in the table supports the idea of a territorial 
polarization process in Ecuador, where poverty deepened in the already worse-
off areas, back in 2001. The regional dimension of poverty is also clear: most 
of the poorest municipalities are located in the Amazon region. One of the 
latest cantons incorporated to the poorest ranking is the newly created 
municipality Tiwintza, which is also located in the Amazon region. Finally, the 
chart also presents the absolute values, as an important reminder of the 
increased number of people behind the [decrease] increase in poverty rates. 
It is important to clarify that due to the dimensions used to assess poverty 
through the basic needs approach, which are mainly related with access to 
social infrastructure and public services, the sensitivity of this poverty 
parameter to short-term policies is lower than the income-based approach. 
However, it has the potential to show the incidence of public spending at the 
local level, as its impact positively the dimensions mentioned afore. 
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3.3 Intergovernmental relations: brief description 
Intergovernmental finances: sources and distribution 
I recall the focus of this research, which is to understand the political factors 
influencing intergovernmental both central government and local governments 
decision making, together with structural elements, such as the concurrence 
with state-owned extractive activities. To this end, it is necessary to address 
both sides of the fiscal equation: sources and uses of public finances, with a 
territorial focus. 
Sources of public revenues in Ecuador 
The extractive industries constitute an essential source of public revenues, 
dating back from the 1970s and the oil boom in Ecuador (Acosta 1995). The oil 
boom was not accompanied of any equalizing effort; it rather remained 
favouring elite structures in the society, besides taming the state-led 
development. Nonetheless, during the very recent years the state has increased 
his participation in resource revenues. This shift in natural resources 
management has motivated inquiries about the scope for redistribution of the 
increased resource revenues, due to a favourable price scenario. In sum, it 
presents the potential to reduce the territorial divide. 
Several changes on the legal framework augmented the participation of the 
state in oil and mining resource revenues. The most critical changes were 
adopted during the functioning years of the Constitutional Assembly (2007-
2008), and can be summarized as follows: first, the dissolution of FEISEH25 
and transferring of this resources to the Current National Treasury Account 
(Grupo FARO 2010, Grupo FARO et al. 2011); second, the sustained 
intensification in oil production conducted by the state-owned enterprise EP-
PETROECUADOR; and third, the increased participation in oil revenues due 
to changes in the taxation system26.  
During 2008, the share of oil revenues with respect to the total national 
earnings reached 32 per cent (4,400.8 US$ million, from which approximately 
2,000.0 US$ millions came from the dissolution of the FEISEH).  A further 
consideration is that public finances proof are highly dependent on resource 
revenues. An instance of this can be verified in the following figure. Oil 
revenues have represented on average 5.6 per cent of the Gross Domestic 
Product during the period 2000-2009.  
 
  
                                               
25 Ecuador’s energy and hydrocarbons investment fund 
26 Ley de Régimen Tributario, 2007 (reformed in 2009) Source: (Grupo FARO 2010) 
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Figure 12  Fiscal vulnerability to oil revenues, 2000-2009 
 
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador Ellaboration: the author 
 
Uses of public revenues: a normative assessment 
Simultaneously to the increase in central government earnings, the share of 
resources allocated to social investment also raised. This has been argued as a 
change of state priorities, where human capital investment appears as a core 
element in the policies adopted. The following figure confirms this. 
 
Figure 13 Accrual social budget as share of the national budget (US$ millions)  
 
Source: SIISE-MCDS 
 
In addition, the above figure places the attention in how internationally 
induced changes in oil prices easily translate in budgetary restrictions. To 
explore the interplay between oil prices and budgetary restrictions, I have 
summarized oil revenues across different governments in Ecuador. It is 
possible to identify a substantial increase in oil revenues supporting public 
finances for the current government. In sum, I bring the attention to this 
element in order to relate it with the increased social investment occurred in 
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the last period: it is rooted in favourable international prices of raw materials. 
There is little evidence of a structural change in the production system; instead 
it remains the fiscal dependence on primary exports. 
 
Figure 14 Oil revenues across different Ecuadorian government administrations  
 
Source: Ponce & Acosta, 201027 Elaboration: the author 
 
This observation has been extended to other leftist governments in Latin 
America: ‘Social spending in the contestatory left has suffered from clientelistic 
practices and is vulnerable to economic downturn as it has been founded by 
extraordinary commodity export revenues, notably oil and gas’ (Kingstone 
2011). 
Intergovernmental finances: the relevance of municipalities 
Because of the attention placed in public finances conducted by local 
governments at the canton level: municipalities, I introduce several reasons that 
validate this focus; coming from the political viewpoint, financial vulnerability 
and social matters. Thereupon, municipalities are relevant: 
 Due to political/organisational reforms introduced in the Constitution of 
2008 ((Art. 238 República del Ecuador 2008), where the state 
decentralises the political organization; by means of recognizing political, 
administrative, and financial autonomy to regional and province 
governments, municipalities and rural parishes. 
 In the last decade, public spending had been kept centralised (Salazar et 
al. 2009). The central government concentrated 81.8 per cent of the 
general public spending (15.6 per cent of GDP on average, for the 
period 1993-2008). Municipalities follow in relevance, they account for 
the 14.3 per cent of the general public spending (2.7 per cent of GDP, 
                                                
27 http://hdl.handle.net/10469/2896 
Government Total* Monthly Total* Monthly
Jaime Roldós 2,239.70$   117.90$          1,982.80$   104.40$          
Osw aldo Hurtado 4,960.60$   121.00$          3,223.80$   78.60$            
León Febres Cordero 4,465.60$   93.00$            3,105.60$   64.70$            
Rodrigo Borja 4,584.10$   95.50$            3,589.40$   74.80$            
Sixto Durán Ballén 5,184.20$   108.00$          3,625.60$   75.50$            
Abdalá Bucaram 855.90$      71.30$            615.60$      51.30$            
Fabián Alarcón 1,476.60$   70.30$            1,053.40$   50.20$            
Jamil Mahuad 1,702.80$   113.50$          1,307.40$   87.20$            
Gustavo Noboa 5,485.40$   152.40$          4,167.60$   115.80$          
Lucio Gutiérrez 6,346.80$   226.70$          4,512.10$   161.10$          
Alfredo Palacio 8,084.70$   404.20$          5,645.00$   282.30$          
Rafael Correa* 18,836.40$ 428.10$          12,474.20$ 283.50$          
*million US dollars
**(from Jan 2007 to Aug 2010)
Nominal oil revenues Real oil revenues
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same period of analysis). The share of the province governments is 
marginal: 3.9 per cent of the general public spending (0.7 per cent of 
GDP, same period of analysis). Regional governments and rural parishes 
are not even considered since their level of public spending is 
unnoticeable yet. 
 Considering that municipalities are the second important channel for 
public spending, the degree of financial dependence from the central 
government is particularly relevant: 74 per cent of the municipalities’ 
earnings (calculated for the period 1993-2008) are transferred from the 
central government (Salazar et al. 2009).  
 Municipalities have the specific competence of providing social 
infrastructure and basic services at the canton level. To a large extent, 
access to both elements: infrastructure and basic services, explains the 
differences in poverty across the national territory. Therefore, 
municipalities have a latent influence on the canton level poverty 
incidence. 
 
Figure 15 Poverty and access to water, 2001 and 2010  
 
Source: INEC and MCDS Elaboration: the author 
 
Legal framework: financing local governments 
With basis in the new law concerning territorial organization, autonomy and 
decentralization in Ecuador –COOTAD (Ministerio de Coordinación de la 
Política y Gobiernos Autónomos Descentralizados 2011), the share of public 
resources from the national [central] government allocated to local 
governments should be submitted to the following criteria: 
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3.3...1 Territorial equity:  
Local governments are entitled to participate on the 21 per cent of the 
permanent national earnings (directly from the National Treasury) and to 10 
per cent of the non-permanent capital earnings from the National Treasury, 
except for those originated by debt. This criterion increases the potential for 
horizontal territorial equity, and attempts to close vertical gaps across 
geographical disaggregation levels. 
The local placement rules formally defined in COOTAD are responsive 
to: 
 Population size. 
 Population density. 
 Basic needs poverty incidence. 
 Reduction on basic needs poverty incidence (annual variation). 
 Fiscal capacity28: that compares the revenues collected at the local level 
to the latent revenues calculated for each local government. 
 Administrative effort: this category assigns 50 per cent in an egalitarian 
basis to all the governments within each local disaggregation category; 
and the left 50 per cent values are allocated in a progressive relation 
between total revenues and current expenditure. 
 Harmonization with National Development Plan and local governments’ 
planning. 
Summarizing from COOTAD: when the source is permanent earnings of 
the National Treasury, local governments are meant to spend up to 30 per cent 
of their transfers on permanent expenditures; and a minimum of 70 per cent 
on non-permanent expenditures, required in order to sustain their exclusive 
competences Transfers from non-permanent national earnings disclosed in the 
National Treasury should be used in at least 10 per cent of non-permanent 
expenditures. 
 
3.3...2 New competences:  
If local governments are own new competences, they will obtain the 
corresponding financial support from the central government. This criterion 
has not specific ex-ante allocation rule. 
 
3.3...3 Compensation for the exploitation and 
industrialization of non-renewable resources: 
In the COOTAD (2010) is stated that the allocation rule will be defined by 
sectorial law. Nevertheless, it establishes its expenditure on human 
development and environmental protection. It also allows its use for public 
                                                
28 Fiscal capacity, administrative effort and planning harmonization would be 
calculated using the last three years performance data of each local government. 
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infrastructure and clean energy projects. Even so, local governments of the 
non-renewable resource rich areas have been accessing to compensation funds 
prior in time. Dating back to 1989, with the creation of the fund for energy 
production shared revenues (Ley 077 de Asignaciones para Provincias por Venta de 
Energía de INECEL); and to 1992, with the establishment of a fund entitled Ley 
010: Fondo para el Ecodesarrollo Regional Amazónico (Regional Amazon Fund for 
Eco-Development) 
A summary of the funds allocated to municipalities under this criterion 
follows: 
 
Figure 16 Total resources from oil revenues sharing fund (Ecodesarrollo) allocated to 
municipalities (US$ real values), 2001-2010  
 
Source: Banco del Estado Elaboration: the author 
 
Changes in the sectorial legal framework together with beneficial 
international oil prices explain the sharp increase shown in the last years of the 
series. From 2006, a partial nationalization of the oils assets allowed a sharp 
increase on oil revenues, also evidenced at the local level29. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to control for population in order to 
assess better the distribution of the oil revenues sharing fund (Ecodesarrollo). 
The following table and figure summarizes the per capita allocation of 
Ecodesarrollo, comparing them with the municipalities’ total earnings. 
 
  
                                                
29 The former Minister of Finances, Rafael Correa (current President of Ecuador) 
introduced a windfall tax of 50 per cent (applied to the extraordinary benefits from oil 
prices perceived in private extractive activities, Ley 42-2006). 
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Table 5 Oil revenues sharing fund (Ecodesarrollo): per capita US$, real values  
Oil revenues participation 
(ECODESARROLLO), per capita real values 
Year Mean SD Freq. 
2001 56.90 USD 28.53 37 
2002 73.93 USD 37.18 37 
2003 97.20 USD 113.68 41 
2004 146.65 USD 96.70 41 
2005 106.73 USD 69.50 41 
2006 133.76 USD 86.24 41 
2007 131.48 USD 88.90 41 
2008 141.04 USD 94.37 44 
2009 156.13 USD 100.26 42 
2010 171.70 USD 95.53 34 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
 
Distributional plots of per capita resource revenue fund transfers 
(Ecodesarrollo) compared to per capita total earnings of recipient municipalities 
are similarly presented below. 
 
Figure 17 Oil revenues sharing fund (Ecodesarrollo) and municipalities' total 
earnings: per capita real values US$   
 
 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
 
Nevertheless, the revenue-sharing transfer system for local governments, 
Fondo para el Ecodesarrollo has been contested as regressive. According to FARO 
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group30 (2010) there is a ‘discretional’ allocation of resource revenues share 
among municipalities. FARO group reveals this postulation by means of a 
cross-table analysis that contrasts the per capita allocation of revenue sharing 
fund [Ecodesarrollo] resources according to the canton level poverty incidence 
(Ibid). 
 
Table 6 Allocation of Ecodesarrollo resources at the province level (US$ per capita 
and poverty rate)  
 
Source: FARO 2010 Adaptation: the author 
 
It the emphasis will be retained in the average comparison provided in the 
previous table, there will be an absence of a clear pattern of resources 
allocation: neither a redistributive, nor an efficiency criterion, is perceived. When 
comparing the poverty rate at the province level with the per capita allocation 
of resources from Ecodesarrollo fund, there is no evidence of equalizing criteria. 
Similarly, the efficiency argument does not hold: the provinces in which the oil 
fields are located (the last three rows on the table) and have the industrial and 
productive infrastructure for this activity are receiving less transfers per capita.  
On the other hand, a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics 
between Ecodesarrollo resource allocation and canton level poverty, using a 
linear regression plot that compares two points in time: 2001 and 2010 
supports the great disparity in access. It is possible to verify a great dispersion 
in the per capita share of Ecodesarrollo at the canton level. However, the data 
gives signs of determination towards a more progressive allocation of 
Ecodesarrollo (evidenced in the positive slope for 2010). 
 
  
                                                
30 FARO Group (Foundation for Advance of Reforms and Opportunities), is ‘an 
independent, impartial and secular Civil Society Organization (OSC) that provides 
support and promotes active participation of the civil society, the business sector and 
state entities, based on research and analysis, for the proposal, implementation and 
monitoring of public, local and national policies, aimed to consolidate an Ecuadorian 
State that is more efficient, equitable, non-discriminatory and democratic.’ Source: 
http://www.grupofaro.org/farogeneral.php 
Per capita allocation Fondo para el Ecodesarrollo (2008)
Province Poverty rate US$ per capita
Tungurahua (Baños canton only)* 45% 59
Pastaza 67% 191
Chimborazo (Peripe canton only)* 73% 300
Morona Santiago 76% 212
Zamora Chinchipe 77% 243
Napo 77% 184
Sucumbios 82% 157
Orellana 87% 158
* Poverty rate at the canton level only
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Figure 18 US$ per capita real values USD$ revenue sharing fund ECODESARROLLO 
and poverty  
 
Source: Banco del Estado Elaboration: the author 
 
An assessment of the intergovernmental financing system 
Public finances placement is at the heart of the debate on decentralization and 
deconcentration processes: it can be an element of confrontation as well as an 
element of pacification of territorial tensions (Castells 2001). And the different 
territories will focus their debate according to their own interests. In some 
cases, wealthy territories will push for autonomy, since a centralist and 
paternalist state will withdraw resources to the common pool and transfer it to 
the poorer areas. In other cases, the same territories will try to keep a centralist 
state design, if they had consolidated as important political interest groups that 
can enjoy and control disproportioned shares of financial resources. A 
converse logic can also operate at the other side of the tail: poorer territories 
can perceive a centralist state as an equalizing agent that works towards them 
and fill the institutional capacity gap that they could face; or, they can perceive 
themselves abandoned by the central government and will in this case favour 
the ability to decide to a larger degree on their own destinies and political 
sceneries (Ibid). 
Thus, poverty can explain the reasons or justifications to finance local 
governments. It also can shape the expectations of a change in the local 
government financial position. Because government spending, that can also be 
conducted through local governments, is perceived as a redistributive 
instrument which can have as a final objective fighting poverty. Additionally, 
the basic needs poverty incidence can be relevant to assess both sides of the 
equalizing criterion underlying intergovernmental finances: it can act as a 
determinant of transfers’ distribution, and it can also be used as an impact 
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indicator for distributive goals, related with the progressivity of the transfer 
system.  
Since this paper is focused on the first side of the equalizing criterion, 
which is related to the determinants of transfers’ distribution; I would just 
sketchily explore in this section the distributive impact of intergovernmental 
finances. For this purpose, I look at the use of financial resources at the local 
level, considering that the basic needs poverty is responsive to investments in 
social infrastructure. 
The next figure shows how the level of capital expenditure at the canton 
level is responsive (or became more responsive) to local needs. This is captured 
by its relation with the basic needs poverty incidence. Besides an overall 
increase in the level of transfers, demonstrated in the displacement of the 
values to the right of the axis, there is variation to a sharper slope in 2010, 
supporting a more equalizing (or pro-poor) territorial investment. 
 
Figure 19 Capital expenditure (logged US$ real values) and poverty, canton level 
 
Source: Banco del Estado Elaboration: the author 
 
To conclude this section, I can brief comment on the distributional 
implications of intergovernmental finances. On account of this, the series of 
central government transfers to municipalities is evaluated with a conventional 
measure of inequality: the Lorenz curve31. In the upcoming graphs, there are 
sings for a more equalizing allocation of current expenditure, conversely to 
                                                
31 The Lorenz curve plots the percentage or total income earned by various portions 
of the population when the population is ordered by the size of their incomes 
(Gaswirth 1971: 1037). In this case, I plotted the per capita real value of capital and 
current transfer, following the aforementioned theoretical principle. 
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what is found in the plot of capital transfers (this remark should not fail to 
recall that in comparison, current transfers represent a modest percentage of 
the municipality local earnings, as the following chapter will discuss in more 
detail.  
 
Figure 20 Lorenz curve: per capita capital transfers (2001-2010, US$ real values)  
 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
 
The increase in inequality from 2001 to 2010 on the per capita capital 
transfers needs to be carefully studied. It has not per se a negative connotation: 
a pro-poor allocation of transfers can increase the inequality, in a simple 
arithmetic reasoning. An equivalent consideration holds when looking at the 
graph on per capita current transfers. Overall, it has a less unequal distribution 
than the per capita capital transfers. However, and as stated before, the share 
of current transfers (that the legal framework indicates should not be more 
than 10 per cent) has a reduced potential to affect the well-being of the 
population at the local level, when compared with permanent investments, 
which can be conducted with capital transfers. But, financing the local 
administration expenses could also be considered a strategic part of 
intergovernmental relations. In any event, the analysis of transfers’ distribution 
requires a more detailed scrutiny, explained in the forthcoming chapter. 
 
  
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
L
o
re
nz
 p
_c
ap
ita
l_
tr
an
sf
er
s 
(b
y 
ye
ar
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative population proportion
year==2001 year==2010
 51
Figure 21 Lorenz curve: per capita current transfers (2001- 2010, US$ real values)  
 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
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Chapter 4 Analysis 
4.1 The data 
Data used for the dynamic model 
The dynamic model uses longitudinal data on local government finances 
provided by the Ecuadorian Development Bank (BEDE), and enriched with 
socio-demographic data obtained from the national census (2001 and 2010) 
and economic variables (oil prices and labour market composition); obtained 
from the department of National Statistics (INEC) and the Ecuadorian Central 
Bank (BCE), respectively.  
Descriptive statistics are provided in the table below. These data were 
subjected to arithmetic transformations: public finances (i.e. transfers, public 
credit, and local tax earnings) are presented in logarithms and refer to real 
values (where 2005 is used as baseline for the price index, consistent with the 
methodology recently implemented by BCE32); population and population 
squared are presented in thousands of inhabitants.  
 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics (dynamic model) 
Local government finances 2001-2010 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Capital overall 14.529481 0.9235029 8.803439 18.98153 N 2136 
transfers between 0.7840169 12.99649 18.48862 n 219 
(logarithm) within 0.481539 8.823396 15.82429 T-bar 9.75342 
Current overall 12.597142 0.9031493 9.278994 16.87132 N 2135 
transfers between 0.7602056 11.14608 16.09203 n 219 
(logarithm) within 0.486397 10.42966 14.78453 T-bar 9.74886 
Public overall 11.995183 1.630203 5.239293 18.12417 N 1164 
credit between 1.028803 10.03383 16.80164 n 219 
(logarithm) within 1.152715 6.508113 15.95606 T-bar 5.31507 
Local tax overall 11.532554 1.788992 3.003595 18.07749 N 2133 
revenues between 1.69398 7.133212 17.89486 n 219 
(logarithm) within 0.6006763 7.145118 14.91611 T-bar 9.73973 
Population 
(thousands) overall 60.55242 206.197 1.238 2336.754 N 2190 
between 206.4204 1.3626 2198.591 n 219 
within 9.113003 -76.7049 266.5911 T 10 
                                               
32http://www.bce.fin.ec/documentos/PublicacionesNotas/Catalogo/CuentasNacion
ales/Tratamiento_Petroleo_Propuesta.pdf 
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Population  overall 46164.4 429585.4 1.532644 5460419 N 2190 
squared  between 429036 1.882206 4839200 n 219 
(thousands) within 35050.63 -502092 915918.7 T 10 
Oil price overall 46.81344 22.52998 19.15671 84.2 N 2190 
between 0 46.81344 46.81344 n 219 
within 22.52998 19.15671 84.2 T 10 
r1=Coast overall 0.3789954 0.4852478 0 1 N 2190 
(dummy) between 0.4862484 0 1 n 219 
within 0 0.3789954 0.3789954 T 10 
r2=Galapagos 
Islands overall 0.0136986 0.1162633 0 1 N 2190 
(dummy) between 0.116503 0 1 n 219 
within 0 0.0136986 0.0136986 T 10 
r3=Amazon overall 0.1872146 0.3901728 0 1 N 2190 
(dummy) between 0.3909774 0 1 n 219 
within 0 0.1872146 0.1872146 T 10 
r4=Highlands overall 0.4200913 0.493686 0 1 N 2190 
(dummy) between 0.4947041 0 1 n 219 
within 0 0.4200913 0.4200913 T 10 
Metropolitan 
districts overall 0.0091324 0.0951481 0 1 N 2190 
(dummy) between 0.0953443 0 1 n 219 
within 0 0.0091324 0.0091324 T 10 
1 $ 2,042,081.11 real US$ value  
2 $ 295,711.62 real US$ value 
3 $ 161,972.20 real US$ value 
4 $ 101,981.84 real US$ value 
Sources: BEDE, INEC, BCE 
 
As can be seen from Figure 19, municipalities’ earnings (from the sources 
detailed below in the figure) shows a considerable rise over time, from which 
capital and current transfers rapidly increased from 2006 onwards. The figure 
also confirms that capital transfers are the more important source of earnings 
for municipalities. It appears that public credit increased its share on the total 
earnings in very recent years, whereas local taxation earnings remained 
unceasing during the period. 
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Figure 22 Per capita transfers to municipalities (mean, real values) 
  
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the Author 
 
The following figure controls for population, using the series in per capita 
US$ real values. By way of contrast, figure 20 takes away the atypical cases that 
Quito and Guayaquil constitute, which as metropolitan districts can absorb a 
considerable share of transfers. In the same way as figure 19 revealed, there is 
an increase in transfers from 2006 onwards, and the decline in 2009 due to 
changes in international oil prices. 
 
Figure 23 Municipalities earning categories, excluding Quito and Guayaquil (per 
capita real US$) 
 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
 
Another point that can be made is that per capita capital transfers have a 
regional dimension. By decomposing the series over natural regions, a diverse 
arrangement is identified. The coast and highlands have been receiving a lesser 
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amount of per capita transfers than the Galapagos archipelago and the 
Amazon region. These regional differences probably account for the reduced 
population size in the archipelago and the Amazon region. 
  
Figure 24 Municipalities current and capital transfers, regional disaggregation  (per 
capita real US$) 
 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the series exhibit high serial correlation: 
Cor[Yt,Yt-1] =0.9479 in the case of logged capital transfers and Cor[Yt,Yt-1] 
=0.8428 in the case of logged current transfers. Consequence of this finding, 
an Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond GMM system estimator33 will be 
applied.  
 
  
                                                
33 GMM system estimator that uses level moment conditions and moment conditions 
in which lagged first differences of the dependent variable are instruments for the 
level equation. 
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Figure 25 Serial correlation matrix: capital and current transfers (logged values)  
 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
 
Data used for the fixed effects model 
The variables considered for the fixed effects model consider only two periods, 
2001 and 2010; corresponding to the years in which national census took place. 
Again, these data were subjected to arithmetic transformations: public finances 
(i.e. transfers, public credit, and local tax earnings) are presented in logarithms 
and refer to real values (where 2005 is used as baseline for the price index); 
population and population squared are presented in thousands of inhabitants. 
Next, the data were enriched with specific census data, which includes:  They 
are given in Table 7. 
 
Table 8 Descriptive statistics (fixed effects model) 
Local government finances, years 2001 and 2010 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations 
Capital overall 14.425481 1.04818 8.803439 18.98153 N =     405 
transfers between 0.8481567 12.0925 18.42563 n =     217 
(logarithm) within 0.6045915 11.13642 17.71454 T-bar = 1.86636 
Current overall 12.823482 0.9198843 9.606685 16.87132 N =     405 
transfers between  0.8518911 10.90568 16.69535 n =     217 
(logarithm) within  0.3216236 11.52449 14.12248 T-bar = 1.86636 
       
Public overall 11.95763 1.758984 6.313869 17.24931 N =     209 
credit between 1.634995 6.313869 17.24931 n =     165 
(logarithm) within 0.6646404 9.339903 14.5753 T-bar = 1.26667 
Local tax overall 11.309724 1.847731 3.003595 18.07749 N =     405 
revenues between 1.685963 5.833136 17.82715 n =     217 
(logarithm) within 0.7134169 8.480182 14.13926 T-bar = 1.86636 
Population overall 60.991 209.0398 1.238 2336.754 N =     438 
(thousands) between 208.6942 1.5295 2211.438 n =     219 
within 15.62173 -110.657 232.639 T =       2 
Capital transfers Current transfers
L1. 0.9479 0.8428
L2. 0.9362 0.7895
L3. 0.9347 0.8364
L4. 0.9274 0.8031
L5. 0.9147 0.7265
L6. 0.9232 0.6713
L7. 0.9114 0.6269
L8. 0.8482 0.8504
L9. 0.7998 0.7496
Corr(Yt, Yt-n)
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Population  overall 47317.77 443242.8 1.532644 5460419 N =     438 
squared  between 439532.5 2.424343 4906164 n =     219 
(thousands) within 60970.53 -661687.6 756323.1 T =       2 
Poverty overall 76.12705 13.80183 29.45412 98.54112 N =     438 
incidence between 13.26834 30.78862 98.02056 n =     219 
within 3.852851 56.13168 96.12243 T =       2 
Public network overall 36.89566 18.20046 0 84 N =     438 
water access between 16.24929 3.6 80.7 n =     219 
(share) within 8.235398 11.49566 62.29566 T =       2 
Labour force overall 0.0243694 0.0247623 0.0031942 0.2266571 N =     435 
industry between 0.0242178 0.0046008 0.2108344 n =     219 
(share)5 within 0.0050496 
-
0.0056915 0.0544303 T-bar =  1.9863 
Labour force overall 0.0050976 0.0199426 0 0.2033949 N =     435 
mining between 0.0215104 0 0.2033949 n =     219 
(share) within 0.0080567 
-
0.0850007 0.0951959 T-bar =  1.9863 
Labour force overall 0.0007786 0.001356 0 0.0176228 N =     435 
energy between 0.0013075 0 0.0174721 n =     219 
(share) within 0.0003512 -0.002294 0.0038511 T-bar =  1.9863 
Labour force overall 0.0197744 0.0112023 0.0034072 0.0907143 N =     435 
construction between 0.0106663 0.0049348 0.0892205 n =     219 
(share) within 0.0047219 
-
0.0198647 0.0594135 T-bar =  1.9863 
Labour force overall 0.0010582 0.001301 0 0.0093659 N =     435 
finances between 0.0011678 0 0.0079669 n =     219 
(share) within 0.0005709 
-
0.0013092 0.0034256 T-bar =  1.9863 
Indigenous overall 0.1199711 0.2083208 0 0.9765142 N =     438 
population between 0.207403 0.00117 0.9324758 n =     219 
(share) within 0.0219084 0.0032987 0.2366435 T =       2 
Mestizo overall 0.522066 2.195987 0 25.46254 N =     438 
population between 2.145166 0.0012226 20.20595 n =     219 
(share) within 0.4807798 -4.734518 5.77865 T =       2 
Illiterate overall 11.67109 5.234017 2.1 39.5 N =     438 
population between 4.998112 2.199706 33.28408 n =     219 
(share) within 1.571932 4.078367 19.26381 T =       2 
Secondary overall 15.28813 6.960046 2.2 36.8 N =     438 
education between 5.061704 5.6 30.65 n =     219 
(share) within 4.783307 6.138128 24.43813 T =       2 
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Oil price overall 51.67835 32.55883 19.15671 84.2 N =     438 
between 0 51.67835 51.67835 n =     219 
within 32.55883 19.15671 84.2 T =       2 
1  $ 1,840,375.16 real US$ value  
2 $ 370,822.95 real US$ value 
3 $ 155,998.24 real US$ value 
4 $ 81,611.05 real US$ value 
5 Labour force as share of total population 
Sources: BEDE, INEC, BCE 
 
4.2 Empirical results 
Distribution of capital transfers: dynamic model 
A GMM system performed on the data revealed the determinants of [the 
logarithm of] real capital transfers. The estimators and robust standard errors 
are given in the Table 7. Columns (1) and (3) report results of a GMM system 
that considers all regressors as strictly exogenous. Column (1) includes only 
time dummies, whereas column (3) includes a time trend, to take into account 
the persistent increase on transfers over time. By way of comparison, columns 
(2) and (4) considers a GMM system where local tax earnings (logged) are 
considered as predetermined, and public credit (logged) as endogenous. 
Column (2) includes only time, while column (4) includes a time trend. 
 
Table 9 Estimation results for capital transfers (2001-2010) 
Local government finances 2001-2010, GMM system 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
L(-1).ln(capital transfers)  0.317 0.138 0.317 0.138 
 (0.124)** (0.072)* (0.124)** (0.072)* 
ln(public credit) 0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.008) (0.018) 
ln(local tax revenues) -0.001 0.031 -0.001 0.031 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) 
Population 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.002)*** 
Population squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** 
Oil price 0.117 0.146 0.011 0.013 
 (0.041)*** (0.020)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Coast region1’ 0.303 0.064 0.303 0.064 
 (2.515) (0.867) (2.515) (0.867) 
Amazon region 0.121 0.184 0.121 0.184 
 (2.427) (0.863) (2.427) (0.863) 
Highlands region 0.158 -0.026 0.158 -0.026 
 (2.196) (0.827) (2.196) (0.827) 
Metropolitan district 4.349 0.698 4.349 0.698 
 (6.006) (2.645) (6.006) (2.645) 
Year 2002 6.560 8.261   
 (2.458)*** (1.195)***   
Year 2003 6.282 7.988 0.123 0.233 
 (2.302)*** (1.130)*** (0.079) (0.084)*** 
Year 2004 5.852 7.349 0.160 0.183 
 (2.139)*** (1.048)*** (0.075)** (0.082)** 
Year  2005 4.598 5.832 0.053 0.109 
 (1.716)*** (0.838)*** (0.061) (0.062)* 
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Year  2006 3.687 4.624 0.167 0.192 
 (1.316)*** (0.644)*** (0.054)*** (0.050)*** 
Year 2007 2.779 3.479 0.218 0.255 
 (0.968)*** (0.475)*** (0.044)*** (0.045)*** 
Year  2008 0.177 0.239 0.058 0.089 
 (0.055)*** (0.044)*** (0.031)* (0.035)** 
Year  2009 3.489 4.458 0.148 0.251 
 (1.309)*** (0.648)*** (0.092) (0.067)*** 
Year (trend)   0.004 0.006 
   (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
m12 -4.3777 -4.8008 -4.3777 -4.8008 
m2 1.4393 0.79057 1.4393 0.79057 
Sargan (p-value)3 0.5292 0.6531 0.5292 0.6531 
Observations 1109 1109 1109 1109 
Number of municipalities 219 219 219 219 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1
 Reference region: Galapagos archipelago 
2 where m1 and m2 are the test results for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
3 the smaller the p-value, the more strongly the test rejects the null hypothesis Ho: over-identifying 
restrictions are valid.    
 
The GMM system revealed that capital transfers are path dependent. The 
estimator of the lagged value of capital transfers showed a significant positive 
relation across the different specifications. Neither the variable for public 
credit, nor the level of local tax earnings, was significant. 
Population (and population squared) was only significant in the second 
GMM system specification (where local tax earnings are considered as 
predetermined and public credit as endogenous). Controls for regional 
dummies and metropolitan districts were not statistically significant. 
Oil prices, were significant across the different GMM system 
specifications.  
There was an overall substantial positive effect with the inclusion of a time 
trend: the year trend showed that capital transfers were steadily increasing over 
time. All time dummies were highly significant. 
Distribution of current transfers: dynamic model 
For a second time, a GMM system was used, to explore determinants of [the 
logarithm of] real current transfers. The estimators and robust standard errors 
are given in the Table 7. Columns (1) and (3) report results of a GMM system 
that considers all regressors as strictly exogenous. Column (1) includes only 
time dummies, whereas column (3) includes a time trend, to take into account 
the persistent increase on transfers over time. By way of comparison, columns 
(2) and (4) considers a GMM system where local tax earnings (logged) are 
considered as predetermined, and public credit (logged) as endogenous. 
Column (2) includes only time, while column (4) includes a time trend. 
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Table 10 Estimation results for current transfers (2001-2010) 
Local government finances 2001-2010, GMM system 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
L(-1).ln(capital transfers)  0.364 0.282 0.364 0.282 
 (0.081)*** (0.054)*** (0.081)*** (0.054)*** 
ln(public credit) -0.008 -0.049 -0.008 -0.049 
 (0.015) (0.029)* (-0.015) (0.029)* 
ln(local tax revenues) 0.042 0.070 0.042 0.070 
 (0.049) (0.053) (-0.049) (0.053) 
Population 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.003) (-0.006) (0.003) 
Population squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Oil price 0.083 0.088 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.016)*** (0.021)*** (-0.003) (0.002) 
Coast region1’ 0.469 1.598 0.469 1.598 
 (1.121) (1.396) (-1.121) (1.396) 
Amazon region 0.582 1.492 0.582 1.492 
 (0.935) (1.435) (-0.935) (1.435) 
Highlands region 0.834 1.489 0.834 1.489 
 (0.918) (1.430) (-0.918) (1.430) 
Metropolitan district -8.779 -1.481 -8.779 -1.481 
 (11.503) (3.672) (-11.503) (3.672) 
Year 2002 5.429 5.561   
 (1.113)*** (1.341)***   
Year 2003 4.557 4.747 -0.539 -0.474 
 (1.053)*** (1.276)*** (0.182)*** (0.159)*** 
Year 2004 4.268 4.442 -0.442 -0.383 
 (0.921)*** (1.171)*** (0.159)*** (0.140)*** 
Year  2005 3.285 3.405 -0.475 -0.447 
 (0.716)*** (0.916)*** (0.139)*** (0.106)*** 
Year  2006 2.763 2.828 -0.15 -0.156 
 (0.556)*** (0.708)*** (-0.119) (0.075)** 
Year 2007 2.102 2.125 -0.017 -0.045 
 (0.416)*** (0.518)*** (-0.085) (0.057) 
Year  2008 0.091 0.063 -0.008 -0.039 
 (0.077) (0.063) (-0.068) (0.058) 
Year  2009 2.375 2.575 -0.39 -0.258 
 (0.543)*** (0.677)*** (0.112)*** (0.071)*** 
Year (trend)   0.004 0.004 
   (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
m1 -4.8595 -5.0725 -4.8595 -5.0725 
m2 -1.314 -1.0951 -1.314 -1.0951 
Sargan (p-value) 0.0041 0.3892 0.0041 0.3892 
Observations 1108 1108 1108 1108 
Number of municipalities 219 219 219 219 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
   
The GMM system applied shown that current transfers are path 
dependent. The estimator of the lagged value of current transfers exhibited a 
significant positive relation across the different specifications. The variable for 
public credit was marginally significant. Yet, the level of local tax earnings was 
not significant. 
Oil prices, were significant only when the time trend was not included. 
The inclusion of a time trend shown highly significance, although, it altered the 
significance of year dummies. No other regressors even approached 
significance. 
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Lobby groups: fixed effects model (two periods) 
A fixed effects model performed on the data revealed the determinants of [the 
logarithm of] real capital transfers and of [the logarithm of] real current 
transfers. The estimators and robust standard errors are given in Table 9. 
  
Table 11 Estimation results for capital and current transfers (2001-2010) 
Local government finances 2001-2010, Fixed effects model 
 
 (1) (2) 
 ln(capital transfers) ln(current transfers) 
ln(public credit) 0.037 -0.055 
 (0.023) (0.043) 
ln(local tax revenues) -0.243 0.038 
 (0.102)** (0.137) 
Population -0.022 -0.002 
 (0.008)*** (0.011) 
Population squared 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Poverty incidence 0.006 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.013) 
Access to water 0.011 -0.005 
  public network (0.010) (0.022) 
Labour force -2.043 7.342 
  industry (5.130) (6.779) 
Labour force -10.380 32.426 
  mining (10.469) (23.863) 
Labour force 203.786 -662.852 
  energy (117.003)* (186.003)*** 
Labour force 6.653 -13.920 
  construction (4.559) (10.822) 
Labour force -18.233 89.830 
  finances (86.684) (108.349) 
Indigenous 4.958 -2.105 
  population (1.562)*** (3.168) 
Mestizo 0.092 -0.069 
 population (0.048)* (0.065) 
Illiterate 0.049 0.006 
  population (0.032) (0.038) 
Secondary -0.004 -0.015 
  education (0.010) (0.019) 
Oil price 0.021 0.004 
 (0.002)*** (0.004) 
Constant 13.681 14.427 
 (1.396)*** (1.975)*** 
Observations 209 209 
Number of municipalities 165 165 
R-squared 0.95 0.34 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
The fixed effects model revealed that tax revenues had a highly significant 
negative interaction with capital transfers, dissimilar to current transfers where 
it was not significant. The variable for public credit was not significant, neither 
for capital transfers nor for current transfers. 
Population (and population squared) was only significant in the model 
explaining capital transfers. Poverty incidence, access to water from public 
network, and complete secondary education where not found significant. 
Lobby groups estimators were marginally significant. The interaction 
between the share of workers in the energy sector and capital transfers was 
positive and slightly significant. On the contrary, its interaction with current 
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transfers was negative but highly significant. Interactions with other labour 
force indicators were not significant. The share of indigenous populations was 
positive and highly significant only for capital transfers. The interaction 
between, the share of mestizo population, and capital transfers, was marginally 
significant, unlike its interaction with current transfers. Education indicators 
were not significant for both dependent variables. Oil prices were significant in 
both specifications.  
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Chapter 5 Discussion 
The evidence that I have examined suggests that political institutions do affect 
the intergovernmental distribution of transfers in Ecuador. However, the 
interaction mechanisms are highly dependent on the model selected and the 
variables included. 
I start by investigating the determinants of the capital transfers received by 
municipalities (expressed in real logged values), and whether political factors, 
and normative features have influenced its distribution.  
The GMM system model supports the hypothesis of path dependency: 
yearly changes of US$647,339.71, on average, are due to an inertial increment 
(as the estimator of the lagged value suggests) if the time trend is considered in 
the model; in comparison to a value of US$281,807.19 on average, it the time 
trend is not included. 
The interaction of capital transfers with public credit and local tax 
earnings shows negligible significance. Consequently, the initial motivation to 
include these variables has no empirical support. Capital transfers are neither 
responsive to a higher level of public credit nor to changes in local taxation 
revenues. 
Concerning normative features underlying the distribution of capital 
transfers, it is assumed that the government observes equity goals. This would 
be evidenced when controlling for population size. Nonetheless, population 
shows significance only when public credit is considered as endogenous, and 
local tax revenues as predetermined. By way of illustration, changes in one 
thousands of inhabitants can be associated with a relative increase in 0.05 per 
cent on the level of capital transfers. Regardless of theoretical assumptions of 
economies de scale, it is provided by the positive sign that capital transfers are 
mainly responsive to population growth. Population squared exhibits the same 
behaviour. 
Oil prices, assumed as a proxy of the macroeconomic performance, are 
significant across the different GMM system specifications. This supports the 
suggestion of fiscal vulnerability respect to oil revenues in Ecuador: for each 
dollar of increment in the oil price, capital transfers increment more than 
proportionally, with a relative change going from 11.7 (if all the regressors are 
considered exogenous) to 14.6 per cent (if public credit is considered 
endogenous and tax revenues predetermined). 
Finally, it seems that the inclusion of a time trend is pertinent. Besides its 
significance, it helps to provide signs of budgetary cycles in election years. 
First, during the year 2004 it is shown a relative increment from 16 per cent to 
18.3 per cent (where the interval is conditional to the assumptions for the 
system specification) that correspond to an election year of majors and 
president. Second, during 2006, year of presidential elections, there is a relative 
increment going from 16.7 per cent to 19.2 per cent. Third, during 2007, year 
of presidential and National Assembly elections, where the estimator shows the 
most substantial relative increase: from 21.8 per cent up to 25.5 per cent. 
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Fourth, during 2009, year in which the last presidential elections took place, the 
relative change in capital transfers goes from 14.8 per cent to 25.2 per cent.  
To sum, capital transfers are responsive to political budgetary cycles. 
Although the results of this study contradict my hypothesis that the 
municipalities can lobby the central government before election years, it gives 
support for a Downsian model, in which politicians formulate policies and 
serve interest groups in order to gain office (Downs 1957). This is also in line 
with the work of Veiga and Pinho (2007), which founds evidence that majors 
lobby for resources during balloting years in order to have more funds 
available for electoral campaigns, and therefore, to increase their likelihood of 
re-election. Besides, this proposition can be related to the hypothesis of Collier 
(2007) : the survival of the fattest, which holds the in abundance of resource rents, 
electoral competition is altered, and politicians would attract votes in the most 
cost-effective manner. If there is the case for patronage politics in Ecuador, 
electoral competition leaves the corrupt as the winners. Unfortunately, 
previous data on specific features of electoral competition is not included in 
this research. 
Concerning the determinants of current transfers received by 
municipalities, the GMM system gives less robust results, in comparison to the 
capital transfers model. Regardless of this, it provides some insights on the 
subject of public spending allocation. First, it shows that current transfers are 
path dependent, but in a lesser extent than the previous case: yearly changes of 
US$1.44, on average, are due to an inertial increment (as the estimator of the 
lagged value suggests) if the time trend is considered in the model; in 
comparison to a value of US$1.33 on average, it the time trend is not included. 
Second, the variable for public credit was marginally significant conditional to 
the assumption of endogeneity, showing a decrease in current transfers of 
US$0.95 on average, due to the interaction with public credit. Third, neither oil 
prices nor year dummies show robust results: significance and direction of the 
impact varies dramatically among specifications. Fourth, population has a 
negligible effect on current transfers’ allocation. 
However, the dynamic model for current transfers uncovered an 
important factor, associated with the inertial component of public expenditure: 
fixed costs of the local administration, which are expected to be related with 
organisational features rather than with normative concerns. 
Lastly, the fixed effects model supports the assumption of political 
support. The presence of indigenous population has a significant impact in the 
share of capital transfers to municipalities, as well as the share of labour force 
occupied in the energy sector. This last point, related with the interaction 
between capital transfers and energy production activities, has its foundation in 
the Ecuadorian legal framework: local governments participate in the revenues 
of energy sales, as stated in Ley 47, Venta de Energía (Salazar et al. 2009). 
Regardless of the econometric results, I find difficult to incorporate in the 
model the channels through which workers can influence local leaders, 
particularly for the Ecuadorian context that presents a highly informal 
economy that encompasses a large unorganized labour force living in 
marginality.  
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The fixed effects model also evaluates the normative criteria in the 
allocation of transfers to municipalities. The results support the assumption of 
economies de scale, where the population is negatively related with capital 
transfers, assuming that bigger municipalities are more efficient and therefore, 
less dependent on central government’ transfers. Nonetheless, capital transfers 
are not responsive to other important normative related variables, such as 
poverty incidence, access to water, and education indicators. 
In sum, political factors seem to influence the capital transfers’ system in 
Ecuador. First, evidence for path dependency from the dynamic model 
supports the notion that politicians observe past values of investment in order 
to decide the optimal or feasible present value of investments. In other words, 
they are subjected to inertia.  
Before closing the discussion, I wish to reiterate the interaction of 
transfers with public credit and local tax revenues, despite the results obtained 
in the model. As the forthcoming figure presents, public credit have increased 
over time. However, there is a great variability on access to public credit, as the 
right side of the figure signals. This has two consequences: (1) bigger 
municipalities, with better institutional capacities are more likely to access to 
other sources of credit (not necessarily public credit, it can also include 
international development cooperation, or private sources), and for which 
transfers are less relevant, and (2) the recycling34 nature of public finances in 
Ecuador, that conditions the smaller municipalities to recycle their transfers in 
order to access to public credit (where the most important provider is BEDE): 
if municipalities are highly dependent on central government transfers, and 
their debt ceiling depends on its value, central transfers will be reprocessed 
through public credit.  
 
  
                                                
34 For a detailed description of the legal framework that sustains public credit through 
BEDE and other public financial institutions: 
http://www.bancoestado.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=38
&Itemid=186&lang=es 
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Figure 26 Public credit and capital transfers, 2001 and 2010  
 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
 
A somehow similar pattern can be described for local taxation earnings.  
Salazar et al. (2009) find evidence of a decrease in the level of local taxation, 
that the authors argue is due to ‘the lack of political will to increment local 
taxes revenues’. In this sense, transfers can offer a perverse mechanism against 
the local co-responsibility on intergovernmental finances.  
 
Figure 27 Local taxation earnings and capital transfers, 2001 and 2010  
 
Source: BEDE Elaboration: the author 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
This study began with the premise that political institutions affect the 
intergovernmental distribution of transfers. The essential elements considered 
to evaluate the distribution of transfers were political factors, and normative 
principles. Political factors evaluated for path dependency, budgetary cycles, 
and interest groups. Normative principles included demographic originated 
economies of scale, poverty reduction, and regional equity. 
The results support the assumption that although recent policies shifted 
towards an equitable territorial development agenda, path dependent and/or 
discretional behaviour continued the territorial disparities in the access to 
central government resources.  
Moreover, this study has uncovered several important factors that are 
associated with the occurrence of resource surpluses. First, resource surpluses 
weaken political and fiscal restraints (Collier 2007). That is the case of the 
Amazon region, which receives disproportionally larger capital transfers (once 
controlled for population), without the consequent improvement in living 
conditions (i.e. poverty stagnation). Second, it provides evidence of fiscal 
vulnerability to oil revenues, and therefore, it raises distress about the 
sustainability of public spending in Ecuador. Provided that oil revenues are 
important for fiscal purposes, a productive transformation with equity comes 
as the next step in the political agenda. Additional research is needed to specify 
more precisely the elements under which territorial equity can be attained. 
Generalizing from the methods applied, I concur with authors like Walle 
et al. (1995) that point at the weaknesses of public spending evaluation. 
Considering that for evaluating policy’s impact, it is required to evaluate how 
different the situation would have been in its absence, analysing public 
spending impact constitutes a challenge: the counterfactual of no intervention 
is tricky to quantify. Therefore, this study cannot be viewed as conclusive. 
I have also seen that econometric analysis applied to the political economy 
related factors has important limitations. Fundamentally, institutions tend to be 
relatively fixed over time, offering reduced variability to be incorporated in 
quantitative research. Furthermore, ‘quantitative analysis necessarily has to 
represent actual institutions with few variables’ (Schnellenbach 2002). Indeed, 
this can lead to oversimplifying complex dynamics, giving as a result fallible 
proposals for policy design. Therefore, a challenging task for further research is 
the analysis of political institutions over time, in a more comprehensive setting. 
Besides methodological limitations, it should be recognized from critical 
reasoning, that intergovernmental finances have a limited scope to achieve 
territorial cohesion: ‘It is important to stress that territorial cohesion requires as 
a precondition, a political consensus and the acceptance of a common project among 
the different regions. Financial problems can certainly become political 
problems, but political problems can rarely be solved through financial 
measures alone. Therefore, we should not demand of intergovernmental 
finances what they cannot do’. (Castells 2001) 
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Whatever its shortcomings, and there are many, the analysis of political 
institutions and its relation with territorial uneven development is offered as an 
alternative to the conventionally used cost-benefit analysis for impact 
evaluation. It is hoped than some of the findings presented here will establish a 
preliminary field for further research. What is more, it is hoped that this study 
motivates a more inclusive territorial development agenda in Ecuador. The 
most important challenge for the state, in order to guarantee Buen Vivir, is 
embrace the territories as the places for social interactions; that contain 
historical and structural patterns, and are in continuous evolution. If the 
research and effort continues, a nation with more justice than the one I here 
described can be visualized.  
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Appendices 
1  Uneven regional development in Ecuador: mapping the inequalities 
 
Map 1Poverty map (basic needs approach, quintiles), province level 
  
 
Source: SIISE 2010 
 
Map 2Poverty incidence map (consumption based approach, quintiles), province level
  
 
Source: SIISE 2010 
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Map 3 Access to water, from public network map  (quintiles), province level 
  
 
Source: SIISE 2010 
 
Map 4 Schooling, map  (year of schooling, quintiles), province level 
  
 
 
Source: SIISE 2010 
 
 
 
